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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY-WHETHER
REQUIREMENT OF GRADUATION FROM AN ACCREDITED LAW SCHOOL WOULD
BE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONDITION TO RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAw-The intrinsic
nature of the privilege involved in an admission to a state bar has been
re-emphasized in the recent New Mexico case of Henington v. State Board
of Bar Examiners.' The plaintiff there had tendered his application for
admission to the bar accompanied with the required examination fee but
had not enclosed with his application any evidence showing his graduation
1 60 N. M. 393, 291 P. (2d) 1108 (1956).
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from an accredited law school or a certificate from a New Mexico attorney
showing the applicant to be a person of good moral character. For failure
to comply with the state rule in this respect,2 the state board rejected
this application. The plaintiff then, through mandamus proceedings,
sought to compel the defendant board and its members to examine the
plaintiff as to his qualifications but, on hearing, the provisional writ of
mandamus was quashed. When plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, asserting that the so-called "college graduation" rule
violated his constitutional rights,3 that court held the provisions of the
rule relating to application for admission to the bar were valid and did
not violate either the due process or the equal protection clauses, so it
affirmed the trial court determination.
The power of the judicial department to generate conditions such as
these probably goes back to England and the time of Edward I.4 Since
then, statutes have generally recognized that prime control over the admis-
sion of attorneys is a matter properly belonging to the courts, who have
been vested with judicial discretion in this connection, so legislation has
seldom been enacted to do more than protect the public against the admis-
sion of improper persons.5 It is to be noted, however, that the earliest
teachings of the common law, and the training of persons to serve at the
bar, was not a task performed by the courts or agencies thereof but was
done, in the main, in the monasteries, the universities, and the households
of the nobility until the rise and development of the Inns of the legal
profession. 6 Following the establishment of these Inns, at least with respect
to admission to the ranks of the barrister group, the method followed in
England has been so different from the one presently pursued in this
country that the question presented in the principal case has not arisen
in the past and will not be likely, in the immediate future, to pose a
problem in that country.7 In certain of the British dominions and
2 Rule 1, § 2, of the New Mexico Supreme Court states: "No person, other than
those admitted on certificate from other states, shall be granted a license to prac-
tice law in this state . . . unless such person shall have graduated from a law
school approved by the American Bar Association as meeting the standards of that
Association." The requirement for a certificate of good moral character is imposed
by Rule 2, § 2.
3 Plaintiff relied upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion and on N. M. Const. 1912, Art. 2, § 18.
4 Pollack and Maitland, Hist. Eng. Law, Vol. 1, p. 194.
5 One such instance may be found in 4 Hen. IV, c. 18 (1402).
6 See Culltnan, "Requirements for Admission to Practice in England, Ireland, the
Australian States, New Zealand, and the Canadian Provinces," 19 Bar Exam. 2
(1950), for a general discussion of the point.
7 Halsbury's Laws of England, 3d Ed., Vol. 3, p. 6, and 2d Ed., Vol. 2, Part I,
p. 479, contains a statement of the English system with respect to both the barrister
and the solicitor groups.
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provinces, however, the matter of legal education, as well as of admission
to practice, is generally under the control of the organized bar, which
usually works in close cooperation with a local university, and the require-
ments are much the same as those specified in the United States.8 Since,
in these areas, both the size of the bar and the number of law schools is
small, the matter of graduation from an accredited school will probably
cause no immediate problem.
It is in the United States, therefore, where a question of this nature
is most likely to arise, particularly since the matter of providing an educa-
tion in law has, for over fifty years, generally been left to the schools
whose product has, because of the uneven quality of the instruction so
provided, been subjected to examination prior to admission to the bar.
The problem manifests itself in two respects: first, is the right to study
law and to be admitted to the bar a right protected by constitutional
fiat, so that any restraint thereon would amount to a deprivation of con-
stitutional rights; and second, if not, upon whom does the prerogative of
fixing conditions for admission to the bar rest?
As to the first of these points, it may be said that, except in a few
former instances where state constitutions directed otherwise, the courts
have continually held that the matter of admission to the ranks of attor-
neys is not a matter of right, hence cannot be considered property entitled
to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 As Judge Cardozo once
said,10 membership in the bar "is a privilege burdened with conditions."
One is admitted to the bar for something more than private gain. When
admitted, the individual becomes an officer of the court and, like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His
co-operation with the court is due whenever justice would be imperilled
if co-operation was withheld. While there may be a right to follow many
of the common occupations of life, this right does not extend to the pur-
suit of professions or vocations of such nature as to require peculiar skill
or special supervision for the protection of public welfare" for the con-
8 The Canadian method is outlined in Can. Encyc. Dig., Ontario Ed., Vol. 1, p. 707,
and in Can. Abridg., Vol. 4, p. 571. See also Wright, "Should the Profession
Control Legal Education?" in 3 J. of Legal Ed. 1 (1950). The qualifications and
the mode of admission of law agents in Scotland are set out in Encyc. Scot. Laws,
Vol. 9, § 3, p. 24. See also a note in 72 Scot. L. Rev. 25 which discusses the reason
for the dichotomy in the English system, the advantages of such a split, and what
might be expected to follow from a fusion of the two branches of the profession.
9 In re Egan, 52 S. D. 394, 218 N. W. 1 (1928) ; Kuckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah
548, 133 P. (2d) 325, 114 A. L. R. 839 (1943).
10 People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465 at 470, 162 N. E. 487 at 489,
60 A. L. R. 851 (1928). See also Matter of Rouss, 221 N. Y. 81, 116 N. E. 782
(1917).
11 Board of Commissioners, Mississippi State Bar v. Collins, 214 Miss. 782,
50 So. (2d) 351 (1952).
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stitutional reference to "life, liberty and property" does not comprehend
every right and privilege known to the law.12 The practice of law not
being an absolute right, but a license and privilege in the nature of a
franchise to be enjoyed only on proof, and maintenance, of fitness and
other qualifications, it is difficult to see how any question of due process
could ever be involved in matters of this nature unless the rules governing
admission to the bar were of an arbitrary or capricious nature.
It having been established that there is no absolute right to practice
law, it must now be determined who is to be the "protector" of the privi-
lege and whether or not the privilege can be saddled with conditions or
limitations of the nature complained about in the principal case. Much
has been written on the point as to which branch of the government,
whether the legislative or the judicial, has been invested with the right
to prescribe the conditions for admission to the bar but, in all probability,
the leading expression on the subject is contained in the opinion in the
Illinois case entitled In re Day.13  The court there said: "The function
of determining whether one who seeks to become an officer of the courts
and to conduct cases therein is sufficiently acquainted with the rules
established by the legislature and the courts governing the rights of
parties and under which justice is administered, pertains to the courts
themselves. They must decide whether he has sufficient legal learning
to enable him to apply those rules to varying conditions of fact, and to
bring the facts and law before the court so that a correct conclusion may
be reached. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that he
possesses the requisite qualification . . . The fact that the legislature may
prescribe the qualifications of doctors, plumbers, and persons following
other professions or callings, not connected with the judicial system, and
may say what shall be evidence of such qualifications, can have no influence
on this question. '14
In accord with the view so expressed is a volume of precedent which
generally establishes the fact that, under this doctrine of inherent power,
it is the court which has control over the admission and call of attorneys.15
12 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 (1866).
13 181 Ii1. 73, 54 N. E. 646, 50 L. R. A. 519 (1899). A graduate of an Illinois law
school regarded by the court as a "diploma mill" there moved for admission,
relying on a statute which purported to authorize the admission of graduates of
law schools on diploma. The statute was declared to be unconstitutional and
admission was denied.
14 181 Ill. 73 at 96-7, 54 N. E. 646 at 653.
15 In re Secombe, 60 U. S. (19 How.) 9, 15 L. Ed. 565 (1856) ; Ex parte Garland,
71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1866) ; In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (1897);
Application of Fink, 109 F. Supp. 729 (1953) ; In re Lavine, 2 Cal. (2d) 324, 41 P.
(2d) 161 (1935) ; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 11. 346, 8 N. E.
(2d) 941, 111 A. L. R. 1 (1937) ; State v. Mosher, 128 Iowa 82, 103 N. W. 105,
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It should be noted, however, that while the court may have initial power
with respect to admission, statutes which may have been passed, making
provision to aid the judicial department in reaching a proper selection
of those qualified for admission as attorneys, are not necessarily invalid.
A Massachusetts court once indicated that if the statute did no more
than provide the court with an appropriate instrumentality for the
ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants, there would be no
encroachment on the judicial department. 16 Statutes of this nature may
be a convenient, if not an essential, way to enable the judicial depart-
ment properly to perform its duties. 17  Very few jurisdictions today,
therefore, hold that the matter of admission to the bar is completely within
the power of one department of the government to the complete exclu-
sion of the other and, generally speaking, there is a degree of co-operative
effort on the part of the two; the legislature, acting under the police
power, fixing minimum requirements for the protection of the public,
with the judiciary, acting under its inherent power, serving to protect
the administration of justice by the exercise of the control it possesses
over attorneys as officials of the court."'
Since, as has been seen, the judicial department does have the power
to control the matter of admission to the bar, it then becomes important
to note what the courts have done to determine which, if any, of the
applicants for admission are to be deemed eligible. The possession of a
good moral character is perhaps the most important and universally
5 Ann. Cas. 984 (1905) ; In re Norris, 60 Kan. 649, 57 P. 528 (1899) ; In re Steen,
160 Miss. 874, 134 So. 67 (1931) : In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. 492. 89 N. E. 39
(1909) ; State Bar Commission ex rel. Williams v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745. 131 P.
703 (1912) ; Danforth v. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 139 Ann. St. Rep. 1030
(1909); State ex rel. Foster v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 23 Wash. (2d) 800,
162 P. (2d) 261, 160 A. L. R. 1366 (1945) ; In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W.
441 (1932). See also Lee, "The Constitutional Power of the Courts over Admission
to the Bar," 13 Harv. L. Rev. 233-55 (1899), and note in 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1085.
The latter makes reference to the unusual situation existing in the District of
Columbia. A few early cases may Indicate otherwise for, in In re Cooper, 22 N. Y.
67, 20 How. Prac. 1 (1860), the court said the power to admit attorneys was not
vested exclusively in the courts, and in Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293 (1863). the
right to practice was said to be a "statutory right subject to the control of the
legislature." See also Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 241, 81 Am. Dec. 62 (1865).
16 See In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N. E. 725 (1932).
17 For other cases so holding, see Rosenthal v. State Bar Examining Committee,
116 Conn. 409, 165 A. 211, 87 A. L. R. 991 (1933), and People ex rel. Rusch v.
WhIte, 334 Ill. 465, 166 N. E. 100, 64 A. L. R. 1006 (1928). Other decisions indicate
that courts will recognize legislative acts regulating the practice of law only out of
comity or generous acquiescence: Hanson v. Gratton, 84 Kan. 843, 115 P. 646,
34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240 (1911): In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N. W. 735
(1933) ; State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 221 N. W. 603 (1928).
18 A comprehensive study of the requirements for admission to practice in Illinois
appears in Sprecher, "Admission to Practice Law in Illinois," 46 Ill. L. Rev. 811
(1952).
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required qualification for admission. 19 The reason for this should be
obvious for the relationship between attorney and client is one which
involves the maximum of trust and confidence. As a consequence, it
would not be unfair to require that the applicant's past life and conduct
should have been such as to give assurance that he possesses the character
and willingness to avoid wrongdoing.20 A variety of methods designed
to ascertain this fact have been developed in the past, many of which have
not been too successful. 21  For this reason, there is a movement afoot,
aimed at weeding out clearly undesirable applicants, to require the
fingerprinting of those who seek admission to the bar.
22
Digressing for a moment to comment on this latest development, it
can be said that the fingerprinting of all applicants could eliminate the
possibility of one person assuming the record of another 23 but finger-
printing is really a negative approach to the problem of assessing an
applicant's character. The chief value thereof lies in its preventive effect
in that, rather than serving to catch an applicant trying to conceal a
criminal record, it would tend to keep such a person from ever applying
for admission. The main criticisms directed against such a system would
bear on the fact that it would be unfair to delay the fingerprinting until
after the applicant had expended time and money completing his educa-
tion and, to this point, no efficient system has been devised to cover the
case of an applicant who erred earlier in his lifetime but has since
rehabilitated himself. It is true that courts have the right to refuse admis-
sion because of prior bad character,24 and that identification through
fingerprinting is almost infallible, but there would appear to be no single
device capable of demonstrating the applicant's character, or lack of it,
short of an exhaustive and careful investigation.
19 Farley, "Character Investigation of Applicants for Admission," 24 Bar Exam.
147 (1955), elaborates on this point.
20 The question of what constitutes "good moral character" is not an easy one
to resolve. See Starrs, "Considerations on Determination of Good Moral Character,"
18 U. Det. L. J. 195 (1955).
21 See, for example, the ineffectiveness of requiring the applicant's own statement
as to his past and of the requirement for the submission of character references by
admitted attorneys as illustrated by the case of In re Hyra, 15 N. J. 252, 104 A.
(2d) 609 (1954), noted in 33 CHICAGo-KENT LAW RwviLw 157.
22 A discussion of fingerprinting as a requirement for admission to the bar is
contained in Hepburn, "Fingerprinting of Bar Applicants-Two-Way Protection,"
33 U. Det. L. J. 37 (1955), and in Merritt, "Smokey the Bear-Guarding Law
Schools and Lawyers," 42 A. B. A. J. 226 (1956).
23 In re Portnow, 253 App. Div. 395, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 553 (1938).
24 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N. M. 304, 291 P. (2d) 607 (1955).
As to whether or not a refusal to respond to questioning regarding Communistic
affiliation or attachments would be a possible indication of bad character, hence
would warrant denial of admission, see In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. (2d) 471, 121 N. H.
(2d) 826 (1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 946, 75 S. Ct. 439, 99 L. Ed. 740 (1955).
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Returning to the point at hand, it must be admitted that the next
most important qualification which a candidate for admission should
possess is one with respect to educational fitness. Except where the
diploma privilege is still recognized, most candidates must submit to a
bar examination, conducted independently of the educational program
carried on in the schools, which serves to screen the product of the
schools and, in general, leads to the rejection of those candidates not
intellectually qualified. Again, however, this could lead to hardship in
cases where the candidate, otherwise fully qualified, had been trained
inadequately because the school he selected was not a competent one.
Recognition of this fact led the American Bar Association, through its
Section on Legal Education, to establish minimum standards for legal
education and to set up the device of approving those schools which met
such standards. If statistics could be made available, they would prob-
ably reveal that the percentage of success on the bar examination weighs
heavily in favor of the candidates from those schools which have been so
approved, with the candidates from the non-approved schools, or with
apprentice-type training, usually failing to demonstrate the possession of
the necessary intellectual qualifications.
Because of this, many courts have, by rule, set a requirement for
admission to the bar or to the bar examination that the candidate be one
who has been trained in an "approved" law school25 although the deter-
mination of whether or not a particular school is one of approved character
has frequently been left to the unguided judgment of the bar examining
authority. In still more recent times, there has been a tendency to add
the further requirement that the candidate should not only have been
trained in but should also be a graduate of, or eligible to receive a degree
from, an "approved" school.2 6  Certainly, if a court may set attendance
at, or graduation from, an "approved" school as a requirement for
demonstrating one of the qualifications needed by a lawyer, the same
court would have the power, as was exercised in the instant case, to
specify what, in its judgment, should be the test of approval for such
an institution.
27
Prior to this, however, only one case has dealt with the precise point.
In the case of Nebraska ex rel. Ralston v. Turner,28 predicated upon a
25 See Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 58; 111. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Cb. 110, § 101.58, Part
111(1).
26 The graduation requirement was added to Ill. Rule 58 in 1952. Prior to that
time, the applicant was permitted to take the examination on completion of 1296
classroom hours of law study without regard to whether he had or had not met
the graduation requirements of the institution attended.
27 See also Harno, "What is an 'Approved' Law School?" 23 Bar Exam. 20 (1953).
28 141 Neb. 556. 4 N. W. (2d) 302, 144 A. L. R. 138 (1942).
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factual situation similar to the one in the instant case, the Nebraska
Supreme Court not only vindicated the power of the court to control
admission to the bar but also upheld a rule which differentiated between
graduates of "reputable law schools," being those on the "approved list
of the standardization agency of the American Bar Association," and
students who had received their training in law offices, each of whom was
eligible to take the bar examination, and those who were students or gradu-
ates of law schools not reputable within the meaning of the rule and who
were, for this reason, not eligible for examination. The rule was said to
be neither arbitrary, unreasonable, nor without rational basis. The instant
case, achieving a similar result, tends not only to reinforce the position
so taken but may foreshadow a course of future development under which
all law schools will, perforce, have to meet accreditation standards or close
their doors.2 9
This prospect should not be considered to be a displeasing one for,
except as it may militate against "vested interests" in a few remaining
"proprietary" law schools, there is no legitimate reason why, in the inter-
est of strengthening the ranks of the bar, courts should not be free to
work toward elevating the standards for admission.
A. M. ZOLLER
BANKRUPTCY-ASSIGNMENT, ADMINISTRATION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF
BANKRUPT'S ESTATE-WNVHETHEP ENTRUSTER, ACTING UNDER TRUST RE-
CEIPT, MAY ASSERT LIEN IN EVENT TRUSTEE SELLS ENTRUSTED GOODS AND
MINGLES PROCEEDS THEREOF WITH GENERAL AssETs--Creditors engaging
in the practice of extending credit on the basis of trust-receipt financ-
ing will be pleased with the decision of a United States District Court
sitting in Tennessee in the recent case entitled In the Matter of Harpeth
Motors, Inc.' In that case, the creditor, holder of a series of trust receipts
each covering a separate automobile, discovered that the cars had been
sold by the trustee-dealer who had, prior to bankruptcy, mingled the pro-
ceeds of sale with its other assets so as to make the same clearly unidenti-
fiable. Following bankruptcy, the creditor filed a petition asserting a lien
upon the assets in bankruptcy for the amount of the proceeds of sale.
The referee disallowed this petition, holding that Section 10 of the Uni-
29 No law school presently operating in Illinois would be affected as all such
schools now have been granted accredited status by the Section of Legal Education
of the American Bar Association.
1 135 F. Supp. 863 (1955).
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form Trust Receipts Act 2 entitled the entruster to no more than a priority
in the distribution of assets among general creditors. The entruster then
petitioned the district judge for a review of this order. The District
Court, following a review both of the applicable language of the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act and that contained in the Bankruptcy Act,3 concluded
that the first of these statutes was intended to create a lien not only upon
identifiable proceeds derived from the sale of entrusted goods but also
upon the debtor-trustee's other assets in the event mingling occurred, so
it thereupon granted relief to the entruster in accordance with such con-
clusion.
4
The question presented in the instant case, while extremely narrow in
scope, apparently called for the first judicial interpretation with respect
to Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. Because the case was
a novel one, however, it is unusual that the court, in view of the extremely
technical and often confusing language of the statute, made little refer-
ence to the history underlying the Act or to the work of the annotators.
In that connection, it may be noted that, as early as 1924, it was recom-
mended that the trust receipt "should be recognized in the statute in the
way the more clear-sighted banker now recognizes it, as a protection not
against dishonesty, but only against insolvency of the borrower."5 The
framers of the Uniform Act apparently intended that the entruster should
have a preferred position since they pointed out that, in cases of insolv-
ency, the entruster should have "a preference for any proceeds of released
security," made possible by Section 10(b). 6 It is also clear that this
section is intended to apply to any untraceable proceeds for, by the next
succeeding paragraph, one which states that, "at the same time," the
entruster's common law right to traceable proceeds is preserved, 7 a degree
of emphasis in this connection is added by the very fact that rights in
traceable proceeds are treated separately. There is indication, then, that
2 U. L. A., Vol. 9A, § 10, p. 308. The provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 1212, § 175, are identical with Section 10 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act
except as to the concluding clause thereof, a clause concerning express and implied
waiver of the entruster's rights, which provisions have been omitted from the
Illinois version of the statute but have been retained in the Tennessee version:
Tenn. Code Ann., 1950 Supp., § 7792.1, et seq.
3 11 U. S. C. A. § 104 accords priority only to certain classes of claims there
enumerated but does not make mention of priorities or liens created by state law.
4 The entruster's position was sustained as to only three of the trust receipts
under which it had made timely demand for an accounting. Relief was denied with
respect to other transactions because of a failure to make demand until more than
ten days after sale of the secured articles had occurred.
5 See Handbook, Nat. Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, p. 537, note 53.
6 Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act, U. L. A., Vol. 9A, p. 279,
Comment C, para. 7.
7 Ibid., p. 280, Comment C, para. 8, referring to Section 10(c) of the statute.
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an additional right, one not previously recognized but of a scope and
extent as indicated by Section 10(b), has been created with intent to grant
a new remedy with respect to untraceable proceeds. One writer who has
provided an unusually exhaustive treatment of the complete Uniform Trust
Receipts Act s also gives credence to this analysis for, in discussing Section
10(b) of the Act, he concludes, with regard to the entruster's rights, that:
"If he can show that the proceeds from a sale were received by the trustee
within ten days of (1) the appointment of a receiver or the filing by or
against the trustee of a petition in bankruptcy or judicial insolvency, or
(2) a demand by the entruster for a prompt accounting, he may receive
the value of such proceeds even though they are not identifiable. "9 The
foregoing comments, then, would indicate that there is ample support for
the position taken by the court in the instant case.
The court goes farther, however, to support its position by examining
closely the two basic issues to be determined in order to reach the con-
clusion it did. They are: (1) does the Uniform Act create a lien or a
mere right of priority; and (2) if a lien is created, does it attach to money
or other assets which are not identifiable proceeds from the entrusted
goods? In respect to the first proposition, i.e. whether a lien is created,
it is interesting to note that courts have often talked in terms of liens
when interpreting this section of the statute 0 but the more carefully
worded decisions prefer to use the term "security interest," in conformity
with the language of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act." In sharp con-
trast, the term "right of priority" is seldom used by the courts when
discussing an entruster's rights. A right of priority, or more properly a
right to prior payment from unincumbered assets, is "a narrow right to
payment at a certain relative point in the distribution of a bankrupt
debtor's property, naked of any power of levy or attachment; it is a
creature of the Bankruptcy Act. "12 The court, in the instant case, made
one final observation on this subject by pointing out that Section 10 of
the Act, by providing the entruster with protection against subsequent
s Heindl. "Trust Receipt Financing Under The Uniform Trust Receipts Act," 26
CmICAGO-KENT TLw REvrEw 197-268 (1948).
9 Ibid, at p. 259.
10 Peoples Finance and Thrift Co. of Visalia v. Bowman, 58 Cal. App. (2d) 729,
137 P. (2d) 7'29 (1943) ; Donn v. Auto Dealers Invest. Co., 385 I1. 211, 52 N. E.
(2d) 695 (1944) ; Commercial Credit Co. v. Horan, 325 Ill. App. 625, 60 N. E. (2d)
763 (1945) ; and Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N. E.
(2d) 28, 168 A. 14. R. 352 (1945). The court in the instant case also appears to
feel that the term "security interest" is synonymous with the term "lien." See 135
F. Supp. 863 at 867.
11 Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal. App. (2d) 439, 99 P. (2d) 1083
(1940); Commercial Credit Co. v. Horan, 325 Il1. App. 625, 60 N. E. (2d) 763
(1945).
12 Moore's Collier on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed., Vol. 3,. § 64.02, pp. 2055-6.
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lien creditors, apparently intended that the entruster was to be regarded
as a present lien creditor. Having reached the conclusion that the entruster
was a lien creditor, an apparently sound conclusion, the court then pro
ceeded to the heart of the problem, that of determining whether such a lien
would attach to unidentifiable proceeds.
As would be expected, the court mentioned that liens traditionally
have been regarded as giving to the lienor the right to have a debt satis-
fied out of a particular thing; a doctrine well understood both at common
law13 and under the Uniform Act, pursuant to which an entruster's right
in and to identifiable proceeds has been upheld.1 4 With regard to uniden-
tifiable proceeds, however, the court was forced to rely entirely upon the
wording of the statute and particularly upon a phrase in Section 10 which
defines the entruster's position as being one to which he would be entitled
"to the extent to which and as against all classes of persons as to whom
his security interest was valid at the time of disposition by the trustee."15
Since this phrase qualifies all of the rights of an entruster conferred by
Section 10, and since the entruster's right "to a priority to the amount of
such proceeds or value"'16 follows in Section 10(b), the court logically
concluded that the entruster's right to a hold on the value of unidentifi-
able proceeds was as good as it had been in identifiable proceeds at the
moment of the disposition of the entrusted goods.
It would be a pleasant thing to conclude this discussion, if possible,
with reference to another case, also of first impression, in complete har-
mony with the one mentioned and with the apparent intent of the statute.
However, the cloud of a conflicting decision has already appeared upon
the judicial horizon. In an even more recent decision reached by a United
States District Court sitting in New York, there appears to be a challenge
to the interpretation achieved by the court in Tennessee. During the
course of its opinion in the case of United States v. Profaci,17 the New
York district court said, by way of obiter, concerning an entruster's rights,
that the entruster could "neither identify the sale of this oil nor follow and
13 Hamilton National Bank v. McCallum, 58 F. (2d) 912 (1932).
14 Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N. E. (2d) 28,
168 A. L. R. 352 (1945).
15 U. L. A., Vol. 9A, § 10; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 121 , § 175.
16 Italics supplied.
17 137 F. Supp. 795 (1955). The case concerned goods which had been ware-
housed and then released on the basis of trust receipt financing. Payment for these
goods by the trustee had been made by a series of checks, the last one of which had
been dishonored due to an attachment of the trustee's bank account by the United
States in a tax lien foreclosure proceeding. The court indicated a belief that the
trust receipt was nothing more than a promise to pay, so reached its decision
against the entruster primarily on the basis of the law relating to sales. The
result might have been different if the trustee had used the proceeds of his account
to purchase bank drafts or cashier's checks payable to the entruster: General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
identify the funds received from the sale of this oil. Under these circum-
stances, the trust receipt cannot be recognized as a preference.''18 While
the holding therein is not strictly in point, there is sufficient doubt cast
upon the decision of the principal case to make it necessary that the future
path of cases of this nature should be watched closely. Nevertheless, it
would appear, from a study of the history of the Uniform Act, that the
principal case is the better reasoned and more thoroughly analyzed one,
hence the interpretation there provided for the particular section of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act is believed to be the one which should be
followed in the future.
L. L. MAHaoN
CONTRACTs--DIscHARGE BY ImPOSSIBILITY OF PERFORMANCE--WHEHER
PERFORMANCE CAN BE SAID TO BE IMPOSSIBIE IN LEGAL CONTEMPLATION
WHEN IT CAN BE GIVEN ONLY AT AN ExcEssIvE AND UNREASONABLE COST--
The scope of the doctrine relating to impossibility of performance of con-
tracts was recently enlarged upon in the California case of City of Vernon
v. City of Los Angeies.' By means of a proceeding for declaratory relief
and injunction, the plaintiff city there sought to hold the defendant
municipality to certain contracts under which the former had the right
to discharge a specified amount of sewage into the sewer system of the
latter. The plaintiff also sought to recover damages allegedly arising
because of the defendant's negligent operation of the disposal facilities
in such a manner as to produce the institution of abatement proceedings.
2
The defendant, because of a judgment against it in the action to abate the
nuisance, had been forced to build disposal facilities far more expensive
than those originally contemplated, so it sought relief from the terms of
the original contract, relying on a claim of impossibility of performance.
The trial court so held, but granted relief to the plaintiff by permitting
it to use the new facilities following payment of its share of the installa-
tion cost.3 The California Supreme Court affirmed this decision and, so
doing, achieved the novel decision that a contract which, by its original
terms, had become difficult to perform only because of an excessive and
unreasonable expense not originally contemplated by the parties came
within the ambit of the doctrine concerning impossibility of performance. 4
18 137 F. Supp. 795 at 798.
145 Cal. (2d) 710, 290 P. (2d) 841 (1955). Carter, J., with Traynor J., con-
curring, wrote a vigorous dissenting opinion.
2 See People v. City of Los Angeles, 83 Cal. App. (2d) 627, 189 P. (2d) 489
(1948).
3 A portion of the dissenting opinion criticized the denial of damages occasioned
by the alleged negligent operation of the disposal system on the ground the breach
by the defendant of Its contractual duties had occurred before the existence of
those conditions which, the majority opinion said, had excused the performance of
those duties.
4 The California Supreme Court did find error in the trial court determination
that the earlier abatement action had operated, by way of res Judo ata, to settle
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Courts have heretofore been reluctant to relieve a promisor from an
obligation which, on the face of his contract, he has apparently assumed
because of a belief in the possibility that the promisor would have con-
sented to be bound anyway in the event the contingency which makes per-
formance difficult or impossible had presented itself to the minds of the
contracting parties.5 This fear that someone may be allowed to escape
from an obligation he has, in fact, assumed has given rise to a tendency to
hold the promissor to the literal terms of his contract, regardless of the
hardships which may be involved, on the ground he could be said to have
made an "absolute" promise. This tendency may stem from the early
English case of Paradine v. Jane,6 where it was said that impossibility of
performance should not excuse the promisor, for he might have guarded
against such a contingency in his contract.
Since the case of Taylor v. Caldwell,7 however, the courts have been
willing to avoid too strict an application of the aforementioned rule, with
the result that several exceptions have come to be recognized. It has been
decided, for example, that performance of a contract for personal services
will be excused by the death or serious illness of the promisor ;8 that one
may be excused his failure to fulfill a promise whenever some supervening
statute or rule of law makes such performance impossible ;9 and perform-
ance may be excused in the event of a fortuitous destruction or non-exist-
ence of an essential subject matter.10 In addition, two other situations
have been brought within the circle of impossibility, to-wit: (1) where the
contract contemplates some particular mode of performance and that
method of performance becomes impossible; and (2) where the entire
purpose and motivation for the contract is "frustrated" by some change
in the surrounding circumstances.'
Commenting upon this situation Williston has said: "It is the differ-
ence between 'the thing cannot be done,' and 'I cannot do it.' The first is
called objective, the second is called subjective.''12 Subjective impossi-
all issues relating to the contracts In question. It did, however, uphold the trial
court on its further determination that performance of the contracts had been
excused by the intervening impossibility.
5 Grismore, Contracts (The Bobbs-MerriU Co., Indianapolis, 1947), § 169.
8 Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (1646).
73 Best & Smith 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (1863).
8 Williams v. Butler, 59 Ind. App. 47, 105 N. E. 387 (1914); Cutler v. United
Shoe Mach. Co., 274 Mass. 341, 174 N. E. 507 (1931). See also Restatement,
Contracts, § 459.
9 Gammon v. Ballsdell, 45 Kan. 221, 25 P. 580 (1891); Restatement, Contracts,
§ 458.
10 Polk Drug Co. v. Benedict, 156 Cal. 322, 104 P. 432 (1909); Matousek v.
Galigan, 104 Neb. 731, 168 N. W. 510 (1920). See also Restatement, Contracts,
§ § 281 and 460.
11 Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., VoL 6, § 1935.
12 Williston, op Cit., § 1932.
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bility would not, ordinarily, excuse non-performance of a contract, whereas
objective impossibility would do so. 13 The principal case, on its facts, would
seem to fall within the subjective classification and, when measured by
ordinary doctrines, would appear to produce an erroneous result for, when
a person, by his contract, charges himself with an obligation possible to be
performed, he must perform or suffer the consequences. 14  If he desires
to be excused from performance, he must so provide in the contract itself15
and, absent such a stipulation, performance will not be excused simply
because performance will require some unusual or unexpected expense. 16
The doctrine accepted in the principal case, to-wit: that extreme and
unforeseen difficulties and expense which tend to render performance
impracticable may serve to discharge the promisor, is of recent innovation,
has not yet gained a firm foothold in the law, and its existence may well be
a tenuous one. 17 By extending the doctrine of impossibility of performance
to cases where performance is merely made more difficult because of an
expense not originally contemplated by the parties, the court is placing
the risk of such fortuitous events on the promisee, apparently because it
considers that, in view of the increasing unpredictability of life in a
complex society, the destruction of the promisee's expectations would be
preferable to the imposition of a severe economic loss on the promisor.'i
There is genuine reason to doubt the validity of such a holding.
H. GOLDSHER
13 Fast, Inc. v. Shaner, 183 F. (2d) 504 (1950).
14 Hal Roach Studios v. Film Classics, 156 F. (2d) 596 (1946) ; Pioneer Life Ins.
Co. v. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 374 Ill. 576, 30 N. E. (2d) 66 (1940); Berline v.
Waldschmidt, 159 Kan. 585, 156 P. (2d) 865 (1945) ; Ellis Gray Mill Co. v. Shep-
pard, 359 Mo. 505, 222 S. W. (2d) 742 (1949); O'Neil Const. Co. v. City of
Philadelphia, 335 Pa. 359, 6 A. (2d) 525 (1939).
15 Gulf, M. & 0. R. Co. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 128 F. Supp. 311 (1954), affirmed
In 225 F. (2d) 816 (1955); Hensler v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. (2d) 71,
268 P. (2d) 12 (1954) ; Ryan Co. v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 317 Ill. App. 549,
47 N. E. (2d) 576 (1943), affirmed in 390 Ill. 173, 60 N. E. (2d) 889 (1945);
Bunch v. Potter, 123 W. Va. 528, 17 S. E. (2d) 438 (1941).
16 Megan v. Updike Grain Corp., 94 F. (2d) 551 (1938) ; Farmer's Fertilizer Co.
v. Lillie, 18 F. (2d) 197, 52 A. L. R. 552 (1927) ; Pahulski v. Ludwiczewski, 291
Mich. 502, 289 N. W. 231 (1939); Borough v. Swarthmore v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co., 280 Pa. 70, 124 A. 343, 33 A. L. R. 128 (1924).
17 Another, and much critized, theory is that all promises, even though uncondi-
tional in their terms, should be deemed to be subject to a constructive condition
to the effect that performance will be excused, if circumstances should arise which
would make performance difficult or impossible, provided the promisor did not
expressly assume the risk of such impossibility. See Page, "The Development of
the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance," 18 Mich. L. Rev. 589 (1920).
18 A policy with respect to a degree of economic fairness to a promisor is apt to
be carried further in cases of temporary impossibility: Restatement, Contracts,
§ 462. If, however, the promisee has changed his position in reliance upon the
promise, the incidence of the risk should not be determined without giving consid-
eration to that factor.
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COURTS-UNITED STATES COURTS-WHETHER FEDERAL COURTS POSSESS
JURISDICTION TO RESTRAIN FEDERAL AGENTS FROM TESTIFYING, AND USING
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED BY THEM, IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS-
Following arrest and indictment for an alleged violation of a federal stat-
ute relating to narcotics,' the petitioner in Rea v. United States2 moved to
suppress certain evidence which had been seized under a search warrant
because of defects in the warrant s and, when his motion was sustained, the
federal prosecution was abandoned. The federal agent concerned, however,
thereafter caused the petitioner to be prosecuted in an appropriate state
court, intending there to testify and use the same evidence in support of an
alleged violation of state law. The petitioner thereupon applied to the
federal district court which had been concerned with the initial proceeding
and moved it to enjoin the federal agent from so testifying as well as to
compel the return, to the federal court, of the illegally seized evidence.
4
Relief of this nature was denied to him in the district court and in the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but the United States Supreme
Court, on certiorari, although divided five to four, reversed the lower court
holdings on the ground that the federal agent was not to be permitted to
use the fruits of his unlawful seizure either in federal or in state court
proceedings.
Although the holding in the instant case will probably have a limited
degree of utility, it provides a further illustration of the difficulties which
attach as the result of the conflict between the federal courts and most state
courts over the matter of admissibility of evidence obtained by an illegal
search and seizure. The point is not one of constitutional significance for
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority of the court, avoided all
consideration of constitutional questions in disposing of the case. The line
of reasoning employed, however, is somewhat disturbing, if removed from
the limitations of the case itself, because of possible future applications.
The process of this reasoning may be set forth briefly as follows: (1) the
federal courts sit to police the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and to
1 The prosecution was based on 26 U. S. C. A. § 2593(a).
2350 U. S. 214, 76 S. Ct. 292, 100 L. Ed. (adv.) 213 (1956), reversing 218 F. (2d)
237 (1954). Justice Harlan wrote a dissenting opinion which was concurred in by
Justices Reed, Burton and Minton.
S The warrant was issued pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 18 U. S. C. A., but it was said to be defective for non-compliance with
Rule 41(c), in that the affidavit, under which the warrant was issued, was based
on unsworn statements.
4 The procedure followed by petitioner seems to have rested on 28 U. S. C. A.
§ 2463, which directs that property taken or detained, when of the character of
contraband, shall not be repleviable but shall be "in the custody of the law" and
subject only to the "orders and decrees of the courts of the United States" having
jurisdiction thereof.
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see to it that they are observed; (2) this policing or supervision extends to
process issuing from the federal courts; (3) the rules are designed to serve
as standards for federal law enforcement officers; consequently, (4) a fed-
eral agent who has obtained evidence in violation of any federal rule per-
taining to searches and seizures is subject to federal judicial control; with
the result (5) that a federal court may enjoin such federal agent from
testifying in a state court with respect to the evidence so obtained, as a
necessary adjunct to its supervisory control.5 The novelty of these proposi-
tions is suggested from the fact that there is only one case, that of Wise v.
Henkel,6 an hitherto rather inconspicuous 1911 decision,7 which can be cited
in support thereof, and it relates more nearly to matters arising in a fed-
eral court, so the extract taken therefrom loses strength when applied to
the situation revealed in the case at hand.
This is not to say that the case was incorrectly decided, for the court
could have reached the same decision without standing on such tenuous
ground. It has been said, for example, that a federal court "has jurisdic-
tion of a bill ancillary to an original case or proceeding in the same court,
whether at law or in equity, to secure or preserve the fruits and advantages
of a judgment or decree rendered therein." 8 In addition, the ancillary
jurisdiction of federal courts generally extends to proceedings concerned
with the pleadings, processes, records or judgments of the court in the
principal case or to proceedings which "affect property already in the
court's custody." 9 It is crucial, therefore, to note that the property seized
as evidence in the case at hand had originally been brought within the
power of a federal court. It is true that the district court had entered an
5 As to supervisory power over federal law enforcement agencies in general, see
the case of McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 63 S. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819
(1943). But the court there expressly excluded any extension beyond that of
reviewing the "standards formulated and applied by federal courts in the trial of
federal cases." See 318 U. S. 332 at 347, 63 S. Ct. 608 at 616, 87 L. Ed. 819 at 829.
6 220 U. S. 556, 31 S. Ct. 599, 55 L. Ed. 581 (1911). A district attorney was there
held in contempt by a federal court for not obeying an order to return certain
property illegally seized. The Supreme Court affirmed a denial of a writ of habeas
corpus.
7 Reference has been made to the holding in Wise v. Henkel, cited in the preced-
ing footnote, only six times since it was decided more than forty-five years ago.
See the opinions in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344, 51 S. Ct.
153, 75 L. Ed. 374 (1931) ; Pothier v. Rodman, 261 U. S. 306, 43 S. Ct. 372, 67 L.
Ed. 670 (1922) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652
(1914) ; Cogen v. United States, 24 F. (2d) 308 (1928) ; United States v. Hee, 219
F. 1020 (1915); and State v. Wantropski, 98 W. Va. 124, 126 S. E. 496 (1925).
Not one of these cases suggests any right of control over the activities of federal
law enforcement officers other than that which relates to proceedings actually being
conducted before a federal court.
8 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U. S. 234 at 239, 54 S. Ct. 695 at 697, 78 L. Ed.
1230 at 1232 (1933).
9 Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Electric Co., 132 F. (2d) 720 at 723
(1943).
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order which did no more than suppress the evidence without acting with
respect to the disposition to be made of the seized property,10 but the prop-
erty was nevertheless still subject to the further orders of the court11
so the federal agent had no right to make any disposition of the material
without the sanction of the federal court. As the property had not been
ordered surrendered, the federal agent controlling the same was clearly left
open to the orders of the federal court with respect thereto.1
2
While recognizing that the decision in the instant case expressly
excludes any consideration of the constitutional aspects involved in searches
and seizures, the net effect it has cannot be ignored when attention is given
to this facet of the law, so the case must be added to the already estab-
lished law in this field if one is to fairly and clearly set forth the principles
thereof and their applicability. The Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, of course, guarantees the right of an individual to be
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. To guard against the
infringement of this right, the United States Supreme Court, in the case of
Weeks v. United States,8 prohibited the introduction into evidence of the
fruits of such searches, made by federal officers, provided timely objection
was made. While the matter of inadmissibility was, at first, interpreted to be
a by-product of the command of the Fourth Amendment, the principle has
since been codified in the form of Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure14 which, seemingly, follows the Fourth Amendment from
judicial implication rather than because of command.15 As a consequence,
it has been held that evidence, even when illegally obtained, is admissible in
a federal court if it was obtained illegally by state officers acting inde-
pendently of federal officers, without any participation therein by the latter
and without any agreement with respect to such evidence, despite the fact
there may have been "a general understanding that evidence would be
exchanged" among the two government agencies.16 Under the holding
achieved in the instant case, however, the incongruous situation now exists
wherein evidence illegally obtained by a state official may be admitted in a
10The petitioner's original motion had sought (1) suppression of the evidence
together with an order denying its use as evidence in any prosecution against him,
and (2) an order directing the disposition to be made of the property. The district
court only entered an order suppressing the evidence: Rea v. United States, 218 F.
(2d) 237 at 238.
11 28 U. S. C. A. § 2463.
12 Even though there is a power to act, the federal courts have generally, as a
matter of discretion, abstained from acting when to do so would affect the delicate
balance between the federal and the state court systems: Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U. S. 117, 72 S. Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951).
13 232 U. S. 883, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
14 See 18 U. S. 0. A., Rule 41 (e).
15 Wolfe v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949).
16 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, § 700, and cases there cited.
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federal court 17 but, conversely, a federal official who had illegally obtained
evidence may be enjoined from testifying in a state court although there
may be no comparable state rule prohibiting it.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, often interpreted
to be a form of "shorthand" for the first eight amendments,", would seem
to preclude state authority from violating the rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nevertheless, it has been established that evidence
so obtained, in the absence of any contrary state rule, may be admitted in
state courts for the United States Supreme Court has refused to prohibit
the admission of such evidence' 9 or to overrule decisions that may have
been based thereupon.2 0  It is true that a state must protect its citizens in
some manner from unreasonable searches and seizures but this does not
necessarily extend to the point of prohibiting the introduction of evidence
so obtained in a criminal trial.21 Now, however, by virtue of the holding in
the instant case, a state which would have permitted the use of evidence
secured as the result of an illegal seizure cannot expect to have the benefit
of the testimony of any federal officer, at least with respect to that evidence
which has previously been offered in, and had been suppressed by, a federal
court. The problem is, to some degree, a matter of moot concern to Illinois
for the doctrine of the Weeks case22 is generally followed in this state,
23
even though there is a disposition to admit illegally obtained evidence pro-
vided it is proffered by someone other than a state official. 24
It is interesting to speculate, as did Justice Harlan in his dissent in
the case at hand, with regard to the dilemmas which can follow from future
applications of the holding therein. As the majority relied on the premise
that federal courts sit to enforce federal law, and federal law extends to
the process issuing from such courts, what would the court say in the event
17 Lustig v. United States, 338 U. S. 74, 69 S. Ct. 1372, 93 L. Ed. 1819 (1949). See
also note in 51 Col. L. Rev. 129.
'5 Wolfe v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 at 26, 69 S. Ct. 1359 at 1360, 93 L. Ed. 1782 at
1785 (1949).
19 Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117, 72 S. Ct. 118, 96 L. Ed. 138 (1951).
20 Wolfe v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359, 93 L. Ed. 1782 (1949).
21 The common law protection took the form of providing for an action for dam-
ages against the searching officer, against one who procured a warrant maliciously
and without probable cause, or against a person who assisted in the execution of
the illegal search. The person subjected to the illegal act also had the right, with-
out liability, to use proper force to resist the unlawful search.
22 232 U. S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
23 People v. Grad, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N. E. (2d) 591 (1944); People v. Dent, 371
Ill. 33, 19 N. E. (2d) 1020 (1939) ; People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131, 18 N. E. (2d) 189
(1939) ; People v. Duchant, 370 Ill. 650, 19' N. E. (2d) 590 (1939) ; People v.
Castree, 311 Ill. 392, 143 N. E. 112 (1924) ; People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N. E.
728 (1923).
2 4 People v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N. E. 849 (1935).
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no search warrant, rather than a defective warrant, had been issued? The
majority of the court also relied on the fact that the district court was not
asked to enjoin state officials nor in any way to interfere with state agencies
in their enforcement of state law. What, then, would the court have done
hade the petitioner at hand been convicted in the state court by the use
made of the illegally seized evidence? One can well foresee a race develop-
ing hereafter between a state prosecution utilizing the illegally seized evi-
dence on the one hand and a federal injunction proceeding against the fed-
eral agents who seized the evidence on the other.
While the majority opinion in the Rea case employs broad language,
the important limiting feature that a federal court had exercised a prior
jurisdiction over the parties to the controversy and had a continuing control
with respect to the property should not be overlooked. It would seem that,
in the absence of these elements, the result would have been fatal to the
petition. If questions of this sort are to be avoided, steps should be taken
to see to it that illegally seized evidence should be treated as inadmissible in
all courts and at all times without regard to the official or unofficial char-
acter of the person obtaining the same and without regard to the nature of
the tribunal to which such evidence is first presented.
R. I. PEREGRINE
CUSToMs DUTIES-VIOLATION OF CUSTOMS LAWS--WHETHER PASSENGER
OF FOREIGN PLANE IN INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT WHO IS FORCED TO LAND IN
THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF INCLEMENT WEATHER MUST DECLARE
DUTIABLE AwrcLEs-The claimant in the case entitled United States v.
532.33 Carats, More or Less, of Cut and Polished Diamonds,1 was travelling
by airplane from Germany to Bermuda via France and Canada with a
packet of diamonds but with no intent to land in the United States nor to
import property thereto. Unforeseen weather conditions forced the plane to
bypass Canada and to proceed directly to the United States, where claimant
deplaned. Insisting on reaching his Canadian transfer point, the claimant
immediately made arrangements with a commercial airline to be taken to
Canada by the first available transportation. Before he could leave, claim-
ant was approached by customs officers, at which time he failed to declare
the diamonds he was carrying on his person.2 The customs officers dis-
1 137 F. Supp. 527 (1955).
2 19 U. S. C. A., -§ 1498(a) (6), authorizes the Secretary of Treasury to prescribe
rules and regulations "for the declaration and entry of . . . (6) Articles carried
on the person or contained in the baggage of a person arriving in the United
States." Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Treasury issued a regulation, 19 C. F. R.
10.19(a), to the effect that all "articles brought into the United States by any
individual shall be declared to a customs officer."
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covered that the diamonds were on the claimant,8 took the jewels into their
possession, and instituted forfeiture proceedings. 4 On motion for summary
judgment,5 the federal district court declared the claimant's diamonds were
subject to forfeiture, stating the claimant's lack of intent to enter the
United States or to leave the diamonds therein was irrelevant in the face
of the requirement for rigid adherence to the demand for disclosure set
forth in the customs statute and regulations.
There are no prior cases which determine the rights or immunities from
local jurisdiction enjoyed by passengers in distressed airplanes which may
be forced to cross the territorial boundaries of the United States for the
purpose of seeking shelter. There are, however, several decisions which
enunciate a doctrine of international law granting a degree of immunity
from local jurisdiction to those distressed ships which may be forced to seek
shelter in foreign territorial waters.8 In that connection, it has been said
that there is "one condition under which a foreign vessel in territorial
waters may claim as of right an entire immunity from the local jurisdiction.
The condition is that such presence in territorial waters be due to fore
majeure. If a ship is driven in by a storm, carried in by a mutineer, or
seeks refuge for vital repairs or provisions, international law declares that
the local state shall not take advantage of its necessity.' "7
While no opportunity has presented itself for a court of the United
States to apply this "distressed ship" doctrine to an airplane forced to land
on account of mechanical difficulties or inclement flying weather, at least
one Canadian decision, that in the case of Pentz, Claimant, and His Majesty
the King,8 has held that an airplane in international flight, forced to land
to avoid a crash, is justified in landing at any place where such landing can
be safely made for much the same reasons as would justify a vessel in
distress to enter a foreign port. In the light of the American acceptance of
the "distressed ship" doctrine, it is plausible to assume that a United States
court would award to a distressed airplane the same degree of immunity as
is afforded to surface ships under similar circumstances. It is true that
these cases, in no way, have determined the rights of individual passengers
3 The means by which the customs officers gained this knowledge Is not revealed
in the opinion written by the district judge.
4 19 U. S. C. A., § 1497, reads in part as follows: "Any article not Included in
the declaration and entry as made ... shall be subjected to forfeiture."
5 See 28 U. S. C. A., Rule 56(a).
6The New York, 16 U. S. (3 Wheat.) 59, 4 L. Ed. 333 (1818); The Louise F.,
293 F. 933 (1923) ; Thomson v. United States, 23 Fed. Cas. 1107, Fed. Cas. 13,985
(1820); United States v. United Mexican States, Opinions of the Commissioners
(1929), p. 174.
7 Jessup, Laws of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (F. A. Jennings
Co., Inc., New York, 1927), p. 194.
8 [1931] Ex. Can. Rep. 172.
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aboard ships or airplanes so forced to seek shelter in foreign territory, but
the're is reason to believe they should serve as a guide in determining the
jurisdictional limits to be exercised over persons who come within the United
States boundaries contrary to their intention, or reasonable expectation.
The expanding use of air travel in international peregrination has
prompted the United States government to participate in several conferences
aimed at developing a uniform air travel agreement. At the International
Civil Aviation Convention of 1944, held in Chicago, two agreements were
achieved, one dealing with air services transit and the other with air trans-
port. Under these compacts, the contracting parties have agreed to permit
air flight over each other's territory (a) without landing, (b) landing for
non-traffic problems, i.e., to refuel and repair, and (c) landing to take on
passengers, mail, and baggage destined to the state whose nationality the
aircraft possesses or to any other territory of any other contracting state.9
Another and somewhat similar agreement had been signed by the United
States at the Pan American Convention.1" While these agreements do not
specifically cover problems with respect to distressed aircraft forced to land,
or the duties of passengers who deplane from such aircraft, it should be
noted that they do contain provisions to the effect that landings made
pursuant to these agreements must conform to customs regulations.
There being no controlling international agreement or treaty to which
the court could turn to reach its decision, and because of an apparent
unwillingness to extend the "distressed ship" doctrine, if this phase of
international law was even considered, the federal district court relied
solely on its interpretation of the customs laws. Two sections thereof should
be noted in that connection; one conferring power on the collector to
examine baggage of any person arriving in the United States, whether such
baggage is subject to duty, free of duty, or prohibited, notwithstanding a
declaration and entry thereof has been made; and the other which confers
authority on the Secretary of Treasury to prescribe rules and regulations
for declaration and entry of articles carried on a person or contained in the
baggage of a person arriving in the United States." The Secretary of
Treasury, under the authority granted in this latter section, has prescribed
by regulation that all articles "brought into the United States by any indi-
vidual shall be declared to a customs officer. "12 Under both of these sec-
tions, the statute requires that the person who is to be subject to the cus-
toms law should "arrive" in the United States. The question arises, there-
9 Cooper, "The Proposed Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in Inter-
national Civil Air Transport," 14 J. Air L. and Comm., 125-49 (1947).
10 See T. D. 46898, 65 Treas. Dec. 256 (1934).
1119 U. S. C. A., §§ 1496 and 1498.
12 19 C. F. R. 10.19(a).
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fore, whether a person such as the claimant in the instant case could be
said to have "arrived" in the United States within the meaning of the
statute and the regulations.
It is clear that mere physical presence within a given area is not enough
for this purpose. In Toler v. White,'3 for example, it was said that a mere
touching of port did not constitute an arrival within the meaning of an act
which required every master of a vessel belonging to a United States citizen,
upon his arrival in a foreign port, to submit his register, sea letter, and
Mediterranean passport to the consul at such port. In the more recent case
of In re Kempson,14 the court stated that an alien had not "arrived",
within the meaning of an immigration act, until entry had been made in
compliance with legal requirements and legal residence had begun. Analo-
gous situations exist with respect to the fact that an entry of an alien is
required before he can be subject to deportation, 15 in which cases the courts
have held that entry is not made until the alien is freed from restraint so
he may physically enter the country. Of more importance, however, would
seem to be the case of Thomas v. United States,16 wherein the court held
that the mere act of crossing the territorial limits would constitute an
arrival except in those instances where the "distressed ship" doctrine of
international law would be applicable. Before an arrival could be said to
have been made, therefore, there must be an intent to do something more
than merely seek a temporary refuge.
Nevertheless, the court in the instant case ruled that the statute and
the regulation in question required that any person who merely crossed the
United States border should show what it was he brought with him. 17 This
interpretation, while innocent at first blush, could have far-reaching effects.
It is conceivable that, under this ruling, passengers of airplanes in unin-
terrupted international flight who merely fly over the territory of the
United States could be required to declare dutiable articles merely because
they had crossed, for a brief moment, into American territory. As this
would seem to be carrying national law to a ridiculous length, it can only
be said that the court appears to have taken too harsh a position in a case
of first impression. It could have taken a more realistic and a less chauvin-
istic approach had it seen fit to interpret the customs laws in the light of
the "distressed ship'' doctrine.
D. H. NIEDERER
13 24 Fed. Cas. 3, Fed. Cas. 14,079 (1834).
14 14 F. (2d) 668 (1926).
15 United States ex rel. Schirrmeister v. Watkins, 171 F. (2d) 858 (1949)
United States ex rel. Patton v. Tod, 297 F. 385 (1924) ; Ex parte Chow Chok,
161 F. 627 (1908) ; In re Simmiolkjier, 71 F. Supp. 553 (1947).
16 23 Fed. Cas. 1107, Fed. Cas. 13,985 (1923).
17 See 137 F. Supp. 527, particularly p. 529.
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE-DEPOSITIONS AND DISCOVERY-WHETHER OR
NOT A STATE STATUTORY PRIvIGE AccoRDED CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNT-
ANT AGAINST COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE IS APPLICABLE TO PROCEEDINGS IN A
FEDERAL CouRT--An interesting question relating to the applicability of
state law in a federal court proceeding was involved in the recent case of
Palmer v. Fisher.' The appellant therein, a defendant in a case pending
before a federal court sitting in Florida, was anxious to secure the testi-
mony of the appellee, a certified public accountant who resided in Illinois,
so she obtained a subpoena duces tecum for this purpose from a federal
district court sitting in Illinois. This subpoena purportedly directed the
appellee to give his deposition concerning an audit and a written report
made by him from the business records and papers of a corporation involved
in the Florida litigation. Following service of the subpoena on the appel-
lee,2 a partial deposition was taken and the matter continued. Upon arrival
of the continuance date, the appellee, on the advice of counsel, refused
to complete the deposition, invoking a privilege against disclosure of infor-
mation obtained in his professional capacity pursuant to an Illinois stat-
ute3 and also challenging the validity of the service of the subpoena.
4
Proceedings were then taken to cite the appellee for contempt of court but
the federal district court, instead, not only quashed the subpoena but also
required appellant to surrender all copies of the deposition so partly made
for destruction. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, on appeal to it, affirmed the order when it gave effect to the Illinois
statute even though federal courts would not generally recognize any similar
privilege with respect to accountants.
In the absence of statute, courts of law rarely extend a privilege
beyond the common law protection given to private communications, the
right to immunity being at best only an equitable one, 5 for it is the policy
of law to require a full disclosure of information by -itnesses so that jus-
tice might prevail. Pursuant to this policy, the granting of any privilege
1228 F. (2d) 603 (1956). Finnegan, J., dissented on the ground the order in
question was lacking in appealable character.
2 The record indicated that the appellee was invited to the Chicago office of the
appellant's attorney, ostensibly to discuss the Florida case. On arrival there,
service was made and the appellee was told he would then and there have to
testify under oath.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110A, § 51, states: "A public accountant shall
not be required by any court to divulge information or evidence which has been
obtained by him in his confidential capacity as a public accountant."
4 See, in that connection, Fed. Rules Civ. Pro., Rule 30(a).
5 Whiskey Cases, 99 U. S. 594, 25 L. Ed. 399 (1878) ; United States v. Levy, 153
F. (2d) 997 (1946) ; Mattes v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 127 (1935) ; United States
v. Weinberg, 65 F. (2d) 394 (1933) ; Sherwin v. United States, 297 F. 704 (1924);
People v. McCormack, 278 App. Div. 191, 104 N. Y. S. (2d) 139 (1952).
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against disclosure constitutes no more than an exception to the funda-
mental general rule. The mere fact, therefore, that a communication has
been made under an express or implied confidential relationship is not
enough to create a privilege6 for no pledge of privacy nor oath of secrecy
can avail against a demand for the truth and the whole truth in a court of
justice except in the case of the historic four privileges which pertain to
confidential communications between client and lawyer, between husband
and wife, between priest and penitent, and between physician and
patient.
7
It is true that obligations of honor were often put forward as grounds
for silence in certain English trials in the early 1600's s and, by the middle
of the Seventeenth Century, it seemed as though this notion would prevail.9
The trend in this direction sharply reversed itself thereafter and, by the
middle of the Eighteenth Century, a privilege based on a point of honor
disappeared. 10 Today, therefore, the chief grounds on which a privilege
from disclosure may be invoked in an English court will be limited to
cases involving one of the professional privileges aforementioned, those
in which disclosure would tend to incriminate the party or expose him to
a forfeiture, those where disclosure would be contrary to public policy,
and, with respect to documents, those where the documents are not in the
witness' possession but are held by him as an agent.1 The accountant-
client relationship, of course, would not fall within any of these cate-
gories yet, in Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of Eng-
/and,12 a qualified privilege was recognized which might some day serve
as the basis by which members of this group may acquire the privilege
accorded to the classical professions.
6 Clein v. State, - Fla. -, 52 So. (2d) 117 (1951); People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff of N. Y. County, 269 N. Y. 291, 199 N. E. 415 (1936).
7 See in that regard, the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence (1942).
A report by the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence, 63 Am. Bar
Rep. (1938), at p. 595, also suggests that the "correct tendency would rather be to
cut down the scope of the existing privileges, instead of to create any new ones."
8 Countess of Shrewsberry Case, 12 Rep. 94, 77 Eng. Rep. 1369 (1613) ; Wilson
v. Rastell, 4 T. R. 753, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283 (1613).
9 Bulstrod v. Letchmere, 1 Chan. Cas. 277, 22 Eng. Rep. 799 (1676) ; Lord Grey's
Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 127 (1682).
10 In Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 586 (1776), the witness was
bound by law to answer all questions put to him. See also Hill's Trial, 20 How.
St. Tr. 1362 (1777).
11 Spokes v. Grosvenor Hotel Co., 2 Q. B. 124, 132 C. A. (1898) ; Reid v. Langlois,
1 Mac. & G. 627, 47 Eng. Rep. 1596 (1849); Greenough v. Gaskell, 1 My. & K. 98,
39 Eng. Rep. 618 (1833).
12 [1924] 1 K. B. 461. The court there held that a duty owed by a bank to a
customer not to disclose his affairs was a contractual legal duty which was qualified
by a requirement to disclose under compulsion of law, or where the bank's interests
required disclosure, or where the customer consented. See also Chantrey Martin &
Co. v. Martin, 2 Q. B. 286 (1953).
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Privilege having been defined as a special grant from the sovereignty,
it would seem, then, that some type of necessary special permission or
consent must be found which the sovereign in its discretion, might with-
hold or fail to provide. Since, in this country, sovereignty generally
resides in the people acting through the duly elected representatives,
legislation has been deemed essential in order to establish any new privi-
leges18 and, as a consequence, it is only in extreme cases that courts should
recognize instances of privilege against testimony or the production of
evidence which have not been provided for by constitutional or statutory
provisions.14 Thus, in the absence of a statute specifically denominating
accountant-client transactions as being privileged, no testimonial disquali-
fication would attach to such matters. In harmony with these ideas, twelve
states including Illinois and one of the territories have enacted statutes
recognizing the privileged nature of communications between an accountant
and his client 15 but the federal courts, acting on their own accord, have
not recognized any such general privilege.'6
Nevertheless, as the instant case would indicate, a question may arise
as to whether or not a federal court should grant recognition to a testi-
monial privilege17 of this nature when the same has been sanctioned by an
appropriate state statute. Prior to the adoption of the present Federal
13 A statute which made certain communications privileged would be a mere rule
of evidence, not one of substantive law, hence would not violate the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment, according to the case of Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Decker,
150 Miss. 621, 116 So. 287 (1928).
14 Scolavino v. State, 187 Misc. 253, 62 N. Y. S. (2d) 17 (1946). Wigmore, Evi-
dence, Vol. 8, § 2285, suggests that even then no privilege should be acknowledged
to exist unless the case involves all four of the elements he mentions, to-wit:
"The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be dis-
closed; this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties; the relation must be one which
in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and the injury
that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communication must be
greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation."
15 Ariz. Code Ann. 1939, § 67-609; Colo. Rev. Stat. 1953, § 642; Ga. Rev. Stat
1943, § 84-216; Fla. Stat. Ann. 1941, § 3933; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 1102,
§ 51; Iowa Code Ann. 1931, § 1905; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1953, § 210.20; West La. Rev.
Stat., § 37.85; Flack Md. Code Ann. 1951, Art. 75A; Mich. Stat. Ann. 1948, § 338.523;
N. M. Stat. Ann. 1953, § 45-512; Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1939, § 62-114; Puerto
Rico Rev. Stat. 1945, § 293.19.
16 Olender v. United States, 210 F. (2d) 795 (1954) ; Falsome v. United States,
205 F. (2d) 734 (1953) ; Garlepy v. United States, 189 F. (2d) 459 (1951) ; United
States v. Hiss, 185 F. (2d) 822 (1950) ; Hemmelfarb v. United States, 175 F. (2d)
924 (1949), cert. den. 338 U. S. 860, 94 L. Ed. 527 (1950) ; In re Fisher, 51 F. (2d)
424 (1931) ; Doll v. Equitable Life Assur Soc., 138 F. 705 (1905) ; United States v.
Stoehr, 100 F. Supp. 143 (1951), affirmed in 196 F. (2d) 276 (1952).
17 The fact that an inquiry is addressed to a witness by way of deposition pro-
cedure rather than in the course of a trial Is not significant in this respect since a
deposition, while unknown at common law, is a well-recognized modern method for
eliciting testimony: People v. Turner, 265 Ill. 594, 107 N. E. 162, Ann. Cas. 1916A
1062 (1914).
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Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts were governed by evidentiary
doctrines set forth in federal statutes but, in default thereof, were left to
apply those doctrines utilized in the courts of the state wherein the par-
ticular federal court was sitting.' Except as the supremacy clause of
the federal constitution would require otherwise, therefore, even the mod-
ern federal courts would feel bound to follow the state rule of evidence,
provided the same was not inconsistent with some federal constitutional
or statutory provision, as it would be the duty of such a court to see to it
that a witness was protected in all of his legal rights.19
Accepting, for this purpose, that a federal court should be willing to
recognize a state-created testimonial immunity, there would still be a sub-
ordinate question as to whether or not such a privilege would be of con-
stitutional character for, if it was not, the witness would have no legal
right to remain silent. While a state statute creating a privilege is pre-
sumed to be the law of the state until challenged and declared uncon-
stitutional,20 at least one writer has expressed the belief that the par-
ticular Illinois statute here concerned is unconstitutional. 21  There being
no Illinois decision on the point up to this moment and the question of
constitutionality not being placed in issue in the instant case, the federal
court was able to give recognition to the statute. The importance of the
case as a precedent is, however, weakened by the presence of this doubt.
Aside from the possible doubt as to the constitutionality of the Illinois
version of the accountant's testimonial privilege against disclosure, there
is real reason to question the legislative wisdom in enacting the statute.
By so doing, the legislature has opened the door to any and every pressure
group harboring a belief that, because of the relationship existing between
the parties, testimonial disclosure would be likely to injure one of them.
If the demand for a full disclosure of the truth in a court of justice is
to succumb so easily to the confidential character of a communication, a
privilege based upon an obligation of honor may again come to be recog-
nized. If this eventuality should develop, the due administration of jus-
tice would be made just so much the more difficult to attain.
R. H. BERGQurST
is Nashua Savings Bank v. Anglo-American Land Mortgage & Agency Co., 189
U. S. 221, 23 S. Ct. 517, 47 L. Ed. 782 (1903) ; Whitford v. Clark County, 119 U. S.
522, 7 S. Ct. 306, 30 L. Ed. 500 (1886) ; Hunter v. Derby Foods, 110 F. (2d) 970
(1940).
19 First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 79 F. (2d) 48 (1948);
Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (1940) ; Application of Heller,
184 Misc. 75, 53 N. Y. S. (2d) 86 (1945) ; Ex parte Taylor, 110 Tex. 331, 220 S. W.
74 (1920).
20 Butler v. Fayercoesther, 91 F. 458 (1899) ; Lloyd v. Pennie, 50 F. 4 (1892)
Witters v. Sowles, 32 F. 130 (1887).
21 See note in 37 Chi. Bar Rec. 291 and the response thereto at 369.
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INJUNCTION-SUBJECTS OF PROTECTION AND REIzEF-WHETHER ONE
DiVORCED PARENT MAY OBTAIN EQUITABLE ASSISTANCE TO PREVENT TIE
OTHER PARENT FROM CHANGING THE SURNAME OF THEIR MINOR CHILD-
An interesting question, one seldom brought to the courts, has recently
been decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case
of Mark v. Kah 1 and by the Appellate Court for the First District of
Illinois in the case of Solomon v. Solomon.2 These cases concerned the
right of a parent to whom, upon divorce, the custody of a minor child had
been assigned to change the surname of that child following a remar-
riage. In the Massachusetts case, the issue arose in the form of a suit to
enjoin the plaintiff's former wife from registering the children involved
in school under the surname of her second husband and from otherwise
representing the children by that name. The trial court granted the
requested injunction, feeling that the substitution of names was essentially
induced by the defendant's antagonism toward the plaintiff and not out
of consideration for the welfare of the children, but the higher court
reversed and remanded for a further hearing when it conceived that,
while the father was a proper party to bring the action, the court should
have accented the well-being of the children as the vital consideration.
The Illinois case grew out of a petition filed in a divorce case, after a
decree therein, seeking to restrain the petitioner's former wife from
maintaining a separate change of name proceeding instituted by her as
mother and custodian of the child. In affirming the grant of a restraining
order on such petition, the reviewing court held that jurisdiction could be
exercised in such a case as the power was said to be incidental to those
powers granted by the Divorce Act,3 even though the petitioner could also
have filed his objection in the separate change of name proceeding.
The jurisdiction of courts of equity in the United States in matters
involving children is a heritage from that jurisdiction traditionally exer-
cised by the English Court of Chancery over the persons of infants and
over their property.4 According to common conception, this jurisdiction
represents the assumption by the Chancellor of the Crown's role as parens
patriae5 and, as exercised, it is plenary, extending to the protection of all
1- Mass. -, 131 N. E. (2d) 758 (1956).
2 5 Il. App. (2d) 297, 125 N. E. (2d) 6T5 (1955). An earlier aspect of this case
may be noted in 319 Ill. App. 618, 49 N. E. (2d) 807 (1943).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 1 et seq., particularly § 19.
4 An annotation in 14 A. L. R. 308 contains an excellent list of citations. See
also 43 C. J. S., Infants, § 5, particularly notes 37, 49, and 50; 14 R. C. L., Infants,
§§ 42-4, pp. 267-71; and 10 R. C. L., Equity, § 89, p. 340.
5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (The Lawyer's Co-operative Publishing Co.,
Rochester, N. Y., 1941), 5th Ed., Vol. 4, § 1304, p. 870.
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rights, real or personal." Although, therefore, in the Solomon case, the
court found a basis for jurisdiction in the powers granted under the
divorce statute, it probably could have acted in the matter even without
benefit thereof, for equitable jurisdiction in relation to the care, custody,
and welfare of infants, at least with reference to those courts possessing
general equity powers, is of an inherent nature and exists independently
of statute.7
The all-important question to be considered, whenever matters affect-
ing children come before such courts, of course, is one concerning the
manner of best serving the welfare of the minor.8 Whether the minor is
or is not a party to a controversy before the court, if the minor's rights
and well-being may be affected by the adjudication, equity not only may
but should act to protect the minor's interests, even though this would
require the making of an inquiry on the court's own motion in order
to ascertain all facts necessary to effect that end.9 This is exactly what
6 Illustrations of the exercise of this power may be found in New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. (13 Otto) 780, 26 L. Ed. 580 (1880) ; Blackburn v. Moore,
206 Ala. 335, 89 So. 745 (1921) ; Turner v. Andrews, 143 Fla. 88, 196 So. 449 (1940) ;
Richards v. East Tenn., V. & G. Ry. Co., 106 Ga. 614, 33 S. E. 193 (1899) ; Lindsay
v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N. E. 892 (1913); Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354,
95 N. E. 345 (1911) ; Ames v. Ames, 148 Ill. 321, 36 N. E. 110 (1894) ; Van Matre
v. Sanky, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N. E. 628 (1893) ; In re Ferrier, 103 Ill. 367, 43 Am. Rep.
10 (1882); Dodge v. Cole, 97 Il. 338, 37 Am. Rep. 111 (1881); Hartmann v.
Hartmann, 59 Ill. 103 (1871) ; Grattan v. Grattan, 18 Ill. 167 (1856); Cowls v.
Cowls, 8 Ill. 435 (1846) ; McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Ind. (Blackf.) 15 (1846) ; Lally
v. Fitz Henry, 85 Iowa 49, 51 N. W. 1155 (1892) ; Watson v. Watson, 183 Ky. 516,
209 S. W. 524 (1919) ; In re Badger, 286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936 (1920) ; Latta v.
Trustees of Gen. Assembly of Presbyterian Church, 213 N. C. 462, 196 S. E. 862
(1938) ; Petition of Travers, 177 Misc. 1044, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 742 (1941) ; State v.
Gronna, 79 N. D. 673, 59 N. W. (2d) 514 (1953) ; In re Stittgen, 110 Wis. 625,
86 N. W. 563 (1901).
7 Emrich v. McNeil, 75 U. S. App. D. C. 307, 126 F. (2d) 841 (1942) ; Clinkscales
v. Clinkscales, 210 Ala. 358, 97 So. 922 (1923) ; Foy v. Foy, 25 Cal. App. (2d) 543,
73 P. (2d) 618 (1937) ; People ex rel. Glendening v. Glendening, 259 App. Div. 384,
19 N. Y. S. (2d) 693 (1940); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 175 Ore. 215, 152 P. (2d) 402
(1944) ; Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P. (2d) 953 (1937).
8 Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A. (2d) 203 (1955) ; Ames v. Ames, 148 Ill. 321,
36 N. E. 110 (1894) ; King v. King, 15 Ill. 188 (1853) ; In re Bort, 25 Kan. 215
(1881) ; Longnecker v. Greenwade, 35 Ky. (5 Diana) 516 (1837) ; Finlay v. Finlay,
240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624 (1925) ; Kay v. Kay, 95 Ohio App. 520, 112 N. E. (2d)
562 (1953). See also annotation in 40 A. L. R. 940.
9 Fletcher v. First National Bank of Opelika, 244 Ala. 98, 11 So. (2d) 854 (1943);
Pereira v. Toscano, 84 Cal. App. 526, 258 P. 429 (1927) ; Clarke v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 393 Ill. 419, 66 N. E. (2d) 378 (1946) ; McReynolds v. Miller, 372 111. 51,
22 N. E. (2d) 951 (1939): Mathews v. Doner, -292 Ill. 592, 127 N. E. 137 (1920);
Mechling v. Mayers, 284 Ill. 484, 129 N. E. 542 (1918) ; Mason v. Truett. 257 Ill. 18,
100 N. E. 202 (1912); Johnson v. Turner, 319 Ill. App. 265, 49 N. E. (2d) 297
(1943) ; Schorow v. Schorow, 299 Ill. App. 618, 20 N. E. (2d) 143 (1939) ; Chud-
leigh v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 51 Ill. App. 491 (1893) ; Cavender v. Smith's
Heirs, 5 Iowa 192 (1857) : Kidd v. Kidd, 276 Ky. 271, 124 S. W. (2d) 66 (1939) ;
Carson v. Hecke, 282 Mo. 580, 222 S. W. 850 (1920) ; Jones v. Hudson, 93 Neb. 561,
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the court did do in the Massachusetts case under consideration for it
remanded the matter for further hearing to assure that the welfare of the
minors there concerned would be given the fullest consideration.' 0
The same basic question also becomes exclusively significant in any
proceeding designed to produce a change in the name of a child, and this
whether the proceeding arises upon an application by the child's guardian
or next friend," or upon prayer by one parent to restrain the other from
attempting to effectuate a change. 12  It is true that, at common law, an
adult individual had a right to change his name at will, merely by the
process of adopting another name without resort to any form of legal
proceeding,'3 and statutes providing methods for regularizing the change
of a name are regarded as being in affirmance and in aid of the common
law rather than in abrogation of it. 14  Nevertheless, a court hearing a
petition for a change of name on the part of an adult is generally vested
with a degree of discretion over the granting of the application, 15 regard
being had to the purpose for and the possible wrongs likely to be produced
by such change, so there is evident reason why it or any other court should
have power to act in much the same way where a minor is concerned. In
141 N. W. 141 (1913) ; In re Vieweger, 93 N. J. Eq. 291, 117 A. 291 (1922) ; Haden
v. Eaves, 55 N. M. 40, 226 P. (2d) 457 (1951) ; Lefavre v. Laraway, 16 Barb. 167
(N. Y., 1856) ; Bennett v. Fleming, 105 Ohio St. 352, 137 N. E. 900 (1922) ; Harjo
v. Johnston, 187 Okla. 561, 104 P. (2d) 985 (1940); Wilson v. Mullen, 11 Tenn.
App. 319 (1930).
10 See, in that regard, 27 Am. Jur., Infants, § 101, p. 823.
11 Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A. (2d) 203 (1932) ; Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga.
App. 280 (1951) ; In re Taminosian, 97 Neb. 514, 150 N. W. 824 (1915) ; Application
of Sloan, 203 Misc. 1035, 118 N. Y. S. (2d) 594 (1953) ; Application of Weiss, 200
Misc. 241, 106 N. Y. S. (2d) 795 (1951) ; Application of Proman, 63 N. Y. S. (2d)
83 (1946); Application of Wittlen, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 726 (1946); Application of
Horn, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 453 (1940) ; In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852, 255 N. Y. S. 616
(1932) ; In re Epstein, 121 Misc. 151, 200 N. Y. S. 397 (1923).
12 Bruguier v. Bruguier, 12 N. J. Supp. 350, 79 A. (2d) 497 (1951) ; Galanter v.
Galanter, 133 N. Y. S. (2d) 266 (1954) ; Nitzberg v. Board of Education of City
of New York, 104 N. Y. S. (2d) 421 (1951) ; Schoenberg v. Schoenberg, 57 N. Y. S.
(2d) 283 (1945), modified in 269 App. Div. 1048, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 280 (1945) ;
In re Cohn, 181 Misc. 1021. 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 278 (1943) ; Kay v. Kay, 95 Ohio App.
520, 112 N. E. (2d) 562 (1953).
13 In re Ross, 8 Cal. (2d) 608, 67 P. (2d) 94 (1937) ; Reinken v. Reinken, 351 Ill.
409, 184 N. E. 639 (1933); Loser v. Plainfield Savings Bank, 149 Iowa 672, 128
N. W. 1101 (1910) ; Smith v. U. S. Casualty Co., 197 N. Y. 420, 90 N. E. 947 (1910) ;
State v. Hashmall, 160 Ohio St. 565, 117 N. E. (2d) 606 (1954) ; Kay v. Kay, 95
Ohio App. 520, 112 N. E. (2d) 562 (1953) ; State v. Ford, 89 Ore. 121, 172 P. 802
(1918).
14 Smith v. U. S. Casualty Co., 197 N. Y. 420, 90 N. E. 947 (1910); Haynes v.
Brennan, 135 N. Y. S. (2d) 900 (1954); Laflin & R. Powder Co. v. Steytler, 146
Pa. 434, 23 A. 215 (1892).
15 In re Ross, 8 Cal. (2d) 608, 67 P. (2d) 92 (1937) ; Re La Societe Francaise
D'Epargnes et de Preboyance Mutuelle, 123 Cal. 525, 56 P. 485 (1899); Reinken
v. Reinken, 351 Ill. 409, 184 N. E. 639 (1933); In re Taminosian, 97 Neb. 514,
150 N. W. 824 (1915). See also 38 Am. Jur., Names, § 29, p. 10.
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view of the common law rule, however, courts have been encouraged to
grant these petitions, denying them only for some substantial reason.1 6
Turning specifically to decisions relating to changes in the names of
minors, it may be said that the tradition of the untrammelled common law
right probably led a New Jersey court to deny a father's motion in a
divorce action to have his child cease using a name other than the one
given at birth for the court said that the ordinary rules of minority would
not limit the right of a person to change his name at will without resort
to a legal proceeding. 17 A New York court also once said that, as it was
no more than custom which gave a person the family name of his or her
father, the general rule was one from which he might "depart if he
chooses. '"18 In spite of these assertions, however, it is entirely possible
that the judges responded as they did merely because they could see no
reason, despite the "welfare" principle which hangs compellingly on the
conscience of the court,19 to resist the change, for they have applied the
welfare concept in still other cases.
20
As the relationship between parent and child possesses a degree of
sanctity, equity has been prone to encourage the continued acknowledg-
ment by the child of his original parentage, even though the marital bond
between the parents has been judicially severed, 2' particularly since actual
paternity can never be changed and, by so identifying themselves, chil-
dren may gain in emotional maturity.22  There is at least one instance in
which this interest in the child has been treated as if it represented a right
in the father to the perpetuation of his name.2" In the New York case of
16 Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark. 377, 247 S. W. (2d) 1015 (1952) ; In re Useldinger,
35 Cal. App. (2d) 723, 96 P. (2d) 958 (1939) ; In re Ross, 8 Cal. (2d) 608, 67 P.
(2d) 94 (1937) ; Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A. (2d) 203 (1955) ; Petition of
Buyarsky, 322 Mass. 335, 77 N. E. (2d) 216 (1948) ; In re Kastenbaum, 44 N. Y. S.
(2d) 2 (1943) ; Application of Lipshultz, 178 Misc. 113, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 264 (1941);
In re Slobody, 173 N. Y. S. 514 (1918).
17 See Bruguier v. Bruguler, 12 N. J. Supp. 350, 79 A. (2d) 497 (1951).
Is In re Cohen, 142 Misc. 852, 255 N. Y. S. 616 at 617 (1932).
19 In the case of Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309 at 312, 114 A. (2d) 203 at 205, the
court said: "When the question presented is whether the name of a minor child
should be changed, the court, in line with its universal duty to protect the interests
of minors, must take into consideration whether the change of name will promote
the child's best welfare."
20 Application of Simon, 1 Misc. (2d) 177, 148 N. Y. S. (2d) 114 (1955) ; Appli-
cation of Sloan, 203 Misc. 1035, 118 N. Y. S. (2d) 594 (1953); Application of
Proman, 63 N. Y. S. (2d) 83 (1946) ; Application of Wittlen, 61 N. Y. S. (2d) 726
(1946).
21 Clinton v. Morrow, 220 Ark. 377, 247 S. W. (2d) 1015 (1952); Nitzberg v.
Board of Education of City of New York, 200 Misc. 748, 104 N. Y. S. (2d) 421
(1951) ; In re Epstein, 121 Misc. 151, 200 N. Y. S. 897 (1923) ; Kay v. Kay, 95 Ohio
App. 520, 112 N. E. (2d) 562 (1953).
22 See Application of Simon, 1 Misc. (2d) 177, 148 N. Y. S. (2d) 14 (1955).
23 Galanter v. Galanter, 133 N. Y. S. (2d) 266 (1954).
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Schoenberg v. Schoenberg,24 the court also stated that the "apparent
generosity of the plaintiff's present husband toward the children and the
possible embarrassment to the children do not overcome the primary right
of the defendant to have his children bear his name." '2 5 But if this can
be said to be a right at all, rather than the evidence of a normal desire,
it is, as judged from a review of the authorities, not an absolute one. It
would, nevertheless, appear to be of sufficient importance to sustain an
effort by the father to at least reach the ear of an equity court in a mat-
ter allegedly based upon the welfare of an infant, for it could be said to
illustrate a father's natural concern in that welfare.
26
Inasmuch as courts are not prone to allow an infant to change its
name, or to permit its mother to do so over the objection of the father,
unless some reason exists to make the change, equity ordinarily will require
that the father's name be retained until the child reaches maturity and
is capable of intelligently determining for himself whether he wishes to
continue to use the surname of his birth or to take another.27 If, how-
ever, some compelling reason exists, the application for change of name
will be granted or the father's petition to prevent the change will be
denied.28 The fact that the mother has been granted custody over the
child does not give her any special right in this regard, for at least one
court has said that the matter of selecting a name is not an incident to
any general guardianship.2 9 The possible inconvenience to the mother in
having to explain the difference in names, or her possible embarrassment
in having to disclose that the child is of another marriage and that she
has been divorced, has also been said to be inadequate reason to thwart
the child's heritage or to cut further into the relationship between the
father and the child.
30
A father who has contributed to the support of his child, who has
shown an interest in the minor's character development, who has secured
the child's affection, and who has evidenced a sincere desire to further and
2457 N. Y. S. (2d) 283 (1945), modified in 269 App. Div. 1048, 59 N. Y. S. (2d)
283 (1945).
25 57 N. Y. S. (2d) 283 at 284.
26Application of Harris, 43 N. Y. S. (2d) 521 (1943).
27 Kay v. Kay, 95 Ohio App. 520, 112 N. E. (2d) 562 (1953) ; Nitzberg v. Board
of Education of City of New York, 200 Misc. 748, 104 N. Y. S. (2d) 421 (1951) ;
In re Cohen, 181 Misc. 1021, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 278 (1943) ; In re Epstein, 121 Misc.
151, 200 N. Y. S. 897 (1923).
28 See, in that regard, the cases of In re Cohen, 181 Misc. 1021, 50 N. Y. S. (2d)
278 (1943), and Application of BiegaJ, 25 N. Y. S. (2d) 85 (1941).
29 In the New York case of In re Cohen, 181 Misc. 1021, 50 N. Y. S. (2d) 278 at
279 (1943), the court said that a contention of this nature was "wholly unsound."
30 Application of Simon, 1 Misc. (2d) 177, 148 N. Y. S. (2d) 14 (1955) ; Galanter
v. Galanter, 133 N. Y. S. (2d) 266 (1954) ; Application of Wittlen, 61 N. Y. S. (2d)
726 (1946).
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maintain the child's physical and emotional security, is likely to find a
judicial tendency to look with favor upon his petition.3 1 Where, how-
ever, a father has been responsible for the divorce, has neglected his
child, or has failed to make prompt objection to the change of name, the
courts will certainly be unsympathetic toward his desire to perpetuate
his name,8 2 either because he will be deemed to have waived his rights or
because, in such instances, the courts will be apt to say that there is no
parent-child relationship to preserve.33 Conversely, a court looking at
the situation from the standpoint of the infant and noting the fact that
he had not known his father; that the continued use of the father's name
would cause him shame or embarrassment; that he would be confused and
inconvenienced by a difference in names between himself and his mother;
or would be disturbed by the resumption of his father's name after he had
been known at school and to his friends by another name, would be prone
to permit the infant to adopt or retain a surname other than the one
given at birth and would deny the father's petition for in-junction. 34
While neither parent has a right to change a child's surname uni-
laterally, an equity court, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, will,
upon objection of one of the parents, determine whether to permit such
a change or to enjoin it. Each case of this type stands, as it should, on its
own peculiar facts and circumstances with the resolution thereof depend-
ing upon those factors which will best promote the welfare of the infant.
S. J. ALBERT
JOINT TENANCY-SURVIVORSHIP-WHETHER SURVIVING TENANT WHO
HAS FELONIOUSLY CAUSED DEATH OF HIS JOINT TENANT RETAINS RIGHT OF
SURVIVORSHIP IN JOINTLY OWNED PRoPERTY-The situation posed in the
recent case of Bradley v. Fox' not only provided the Supreme Court of
Illinois with another opportunity to determine the rights enjoyed by a
surviving joint tenant who had murdered his co-tenant but also gave it
an excellent chance to depict one of the fundamental weaknesses which
can lie in too great a reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis. According
to the facts of that case, a husband and wife, subsequent to their mar-
riage, had pooled their individual funds and had taken title to a parcel
of real property as joint tenants. The husband thereafter took the life
31 Kay v. Kay, 95 Ohio App. 520, 112 N. E. (2d) 562 (1953).
32 See cases cited in note 20, ante, and the case entitled Application of Horn,
21 N. Y. S. (2d) 453 (1940).
33 Don v. Don, 142 Conn. 309, 114 A. (2d) 203 (1955).
34 Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga. App. 280, 63 S. E. (2d) 354 (1951).
1 7 Ill. (2d) 106, 129 N. E. (2d) 699 (1955).
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of his wife 2 and, following this, conveyed the property to the attorney who
defended him as security for the payment of attorney's fees, the attorney
taking with full knowledge of the facts and circumstances. The plain-
tiffs in the action, a daughter of the decedent by a former marriage and
the administrator of the decedent's estate, then commenced suit, one count
being directed toward the recovery of damages for the wrongful death3
and the other seeking to establish a constructive trust in the property
formerly held in joint tenancy. A motion to dismiss the entire complaint
for failure to state a cause of action having been sustained in the trial
court, the case was taken on direct appeal to the Supreme Court.4  The
plaintiffs there contended that, inasmuch as the principal defendant had
acquired the sole legal title to the property by his felonious act, it was
unconscionable to permit him, or his successor in interest, to retain the
entire beneficial interest in the property and, as a consequence, equity
should impose a constructive trust thereon for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court, reversing the trial court decision and remanding the
cause with directions, concluded that as the husband, by his felonious act,
had destroyed the right of survivorship, it was lawful to permit him to
retain no more than the title to an undivided one-half interest in the prop-
erty in dispute as a tenant in common.
The problem of determining the extent of the rights enjoyed by a sur-
viving joint tenant who had murdered his co-tenant had, prior to the
instant case, arisen only once before in Illinois. In the case of Welsh v.
James,5 decided in 1951, the victim's heir sought the same relief as was
applied for in the instant case but the Supreme Court, sustaining a defense
motion to dismiss, there concluded that the wrong-doing survivor could not,
constitutionally, be deprived of his right of survivorship. The court
there based its decision on the proposition that, as the survivor took the
whole interest by virtue of the original contract or conveyance and gained
nothing by the death, a forfeiture would necessarily result if a court
decision were to take any part of the property from him.6 By deciding
2 For this offense, the husband was subsequently convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to the penitentiary.
3 The claim for damages for wrongful death was dismissed In the trial court but,
on appeal, the defendant's contention that, as a surviving spouse-beneficiary, his
contributory fault operated to bar the other beneficiaries from recovering under the
Wrongful Death Act was rejected. This point is dealt with more elaborately In a
note to the case of Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. (2d) 608, 131 N. E. (2d) 525 (1956),
which appears elsewhere In this Issue.
4 Direct appeal was proper as a freehold was involved: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75.
5408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1951), noted in 29 CHicAoo-KENT LAW REVrsw
260.
6 Forfeiture of property as a penalty for commission of crime Is prohibited by
Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 11.
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in this manner, the court then fell into line with a series of other outside
cases similar in their facts but where the property was either held under
a tenancy by entirety7 or partook of the nature of a joint and survivorship
bank account." While it is true that, in these cases, the courts concerned
had indicated that the slayer, holding a present vested interest in the
whole property before the murder, was not to be deprived thereof merely
because he had violated public policy in some other respect,9 at least one
of the opinions expressed a sense of dissatisfaction together with an uneasy
feeling that the court, in reality, was enforcing a right of survivorship.' 0
In direct opposition to this view, certain of the inferior New York
courts have seen fit to deprive the wrongdoer completely of any share
whatever in the jointly owned property." They have looked, for sub-
stantiation of their position, to the common law rule that a man may not
be allowed to profit by his own wrong 12 as well as to the doctrine of the
civil law which deprived one who had procured the death of another from
succeeding to the estate on the ground that he was unworthy of inherit-
ance.' s It should be noted, however, that in none of the New York cases
was the question of forfeiture raised, although there is a statute in that
7 See National City Bank of Evansville v. Bledsoe, - Ind. App. -, 133 N. E. (2d)
877 (1956), wherein Kendall, J., wrote a dissenting opinion concurred In by Bowen,
J., and the cases of Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P. (2d) 971 (1939), and
Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. 108 (1907). For a case
dealing with a joint tenancy problem, see Smith v. Greenburg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.
(2d) 514 (1950).
8 Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N. E. 839 (1935) ; Schuman v. Schick,
95 Ohio App. 413, 120 N. E. (2d) 330 (1953).
9 For a full discussion of this view, especially as It pertains to a tenancy by
entirety, see the dissenting opinion of Dethmers, J., concurred in by Sharpe,
Boyles and Reid, JJ., in the case of Budwitt v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N. W. (2d)
841 (1954). In an even more recent case that of Goldsmith v. Pearce, - Mich. -,
75 N. W. (2d) 810 (1956), Dethmers, then Ch. J., again dissented, with concurrence
on the part of Sharpe and Boyles, JJ., for the reasons stated in his dissenting
opinion in the earlier case. Reid, J., however, this time wrote the majority opinion.
lo In Oleff v. Hodapp, for example, the court said: "We are not subscribing to
righteousness of Tego's legal status; but this is a court of law and not a theological
institution. We have no powers to attaint Tego in any way, shape or form. Prop-
erty cannot be taken from an individual who Is legally entitled to It because he
violated a public policy. Property rights are too sacred to be subjected to a danger
of that character. We experience no satisfaction in holding that Tego is entitled
to this account, but that is the law, and we must so find." See 129 Ohio St. 432 at
438, 195 N. B. 838 at 841.
l1Blerbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N. Y. S. 176 (1935); In re
Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N. Y. S. 116 (1925); Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,
103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (1918).
12 See People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324 at 341, 110 N. E. 945 at 950 (1915), where
the court said: "The principle is fundamental that no man shall be permitted to
profit by his own wrong. It enters by implication into all contracts, and all laws."
I3 Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (1918). See, in that
regard, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 167.
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state directed against the forfeiture of an estate by reason of a conviction
for crime.
14
While the New York cases appear to stand alone in the solution they
have achieved with respect to this problem,15 they are not the only ones
which rely upon the timeless maxim nullus commoduim capere potest de
injuria sua propria.16 In fact, it would appear to be the trend of modern
authority to allow the killer to retain the legal title to the whole property
but, in these instances, to permit equity to impose a constructive trust,
of varying proportions, for the benefit of the victim's heirs.17 In review-
ing these decisions, however, one is confronted with a startling lack of
uniformity among the jurisdictions as to just how much of the property
should be so held in trust. Delaware has gone so far as to impose a con-
structive trust over the entire estate legally held by the survivor, giving
him no more than the commuted value of the net income of one-half of
the property for the number of years of his life expectancy.' 8 New Jer-
sey, dealing with the constructive trust doctrine in two instances, first
gave the victim's heirs no more than the value of the victim's interest in
the net income of the property for her normal life expectancy 19 but, in a
later case, erected a trust over the entire property, subject to a lien for
the commuted value, at the time of the victim's death, of the net income
of one-half of the property for the number of years of his life expectancy
as determined according to the mortality tables used in the court.20  In
Minnesota and North Carolina, the courts have developed a less complex
solution,21 with the legal title passing to the slayer to be held by him as a
14 McKinney, Cons. Laws N. Y., Vol. 39, Penal Law, § 512.
15 The rule in Wisconsin might be said to be in accord, but could be open to
differentiation. In a case of first impression, that of In re King's Estate, 261 Wis.
266, 52 N. W. (2d) 855 (1952), wherein Currie, J., wrote a dissenting opinion
Joined in by Fritz, C. J., and Broadfoot, J., the majority held that no estate, in
trust or otherwise, passed to the slayer upon the death of the slain person. Accord-
ing to the facts of that case, the slayer had murdered his Joint tenant and, imme-
diately thereafter, committed suicide. The court, reasoning that the slayer could
not deprive his co-tenant of her rights by murdering her, indicated that her right of
survivorship continued in her administrator and heirs at law after her death so
that, when the slayer died, her right of survivorship became operative and vested
the entire estate in her heirs.
16 2 Co. Litt. 148(b). The maxim may be translated to mean: "No man can take
advantage of his own wrong."
17 See the dissenting opinion by Williams, J., in Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St.
432, 195 N. E. 838 (1935).
18 Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A. (2d) 923 (1951).
1' Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 A. 517 (1933). It should be noted
that the wrongdoer in the case was younger than his victim. For this reason, the
court expressed belief that he would, in all probability, have outlived her in the
normal course of events, hence would have, in time, succeeded to the entire estate.
2 o Niemann v. Hurff, 14 N. J. Super. 479, 82 A. (2d) 471 (1951).
21 Illustrations of this view may be found in Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54
N. W. (2d) 385 (1952), and in Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188
(1927).
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constructive trustee to the extent of the share held by the victim prior
to death for the benefit of the victim's heirs, to whom the entire estate
would pass upon the death of the constructive trustee.22  While these
applications of the constructive trust doctrine may be said to produce an
equitable and just solution to the problem, it cannot be denied that the
principle comes perilously close to working a forfeiture.
To avoid this predicament, some courts have devised another way by
which the wrongdoer may be precluded from benefiting from his wrongful
act.23  Under it, the wrongful act is deemed to have operated so as to
terminate the joint tenancy, thus allowing the property to go as if held by
tenants in common. The slayer is thereby allowed to retain ownership in
an undivided proportionate part but gains no title to, or right of enjoy-
ment in, the remainder, which remaining portion is immediately vested
in the heirs at law or next kin of the murdered co-tenant. As this grant
to the slayer of an undivided interest in the property as tenant in com-
mon gives him everything to which he could normally be said to be
entitled had a partition occurred, this disposition of the matter in no way
results in depriving him of any property right guaranteed by any pro-
vision of a state or the federal constitution.
The instant case, representing a clear-cut reversal in the rule hereto-
fore established in this state, represents a comprehensive illustration of
the application of this "tenancy in common" solution. 24  First, the court
did away with that legal fiction incident to the concept of joint tenancy
whereby each tenant has been deemed to hold the entire estate, as if from
the outset, by virtue of the original contract or conveyance. 25  It then
held that an implied condition in every joint tenancy contract was
breached at the moment the murderer killed his co-tenant. 26 This, in turn,
22 This is the view advocated by such text writers as Ames, Lectures on Legal
History, pp. 310-22; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 3, § 478; Scott, Trusts,
§ 493.2; and advanced in Restatement, Restitution, §§ 187-8.
23 In addition to the holding in the instant case, see Hogan v. Martin, - Fla. -,
52 So. (2d) 806 (1951) ; Ashwood v. Patterson, - Fla. -, 49 So. (2d) 848 (1951);
Cowan v. Plesant, - Ky. App. -, 263 S. W. (2d) 494 (1953) : Goldsmith v. Pearce,
- Mich. -, 75 N. W. (2d) 810 (1956) ; Budwitt v. Herr, 339 Mich. 265, 63 N. W.
(2d) 841 (1954) ; Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S. W. (2d) 464 (1948) ; and
Barnett v. Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. (2d) 757 (1930). See also the dis-
senting opinion by Currie, J., in In re King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N. W. (2d)
855 (1952).
24 While the case was ultimately decided upon the "tenancy in common" theory,
the court did discuss, with apparent approval, the constructive trust theory men-
tioned herein.
25 Where equitable principles intervene this legal fiction must, of course, be
ignored. It has, however, been utilized in tax problems and some revision may have
to be made in the thinking in that area as a consequence of the decision.
26 In that connection, the court said: "In joint tenancy the contract that the
survivor will take the whole necessarily presupposes that the death of either will
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led to a destruction of one of the four coexisting unities necessary in a
joint tenancy, thus causing a severance of the joint estate and an accom-
panying extinguishment of the right of survivorship.27  The joint ten-
ancy being so dissolved, the tenants held as tenants in common with the
consequence that the slayer never realized any additional interest in the
property which could be made the subject of a forfeiture.
A fifth solution to the problem, offered as a suggestion in the opin-
ions of certain of the American courts,28 would require action on the part
of the legislature. Pennsylvania appears to have responded to this sug-
gestion by the enactment of its so-called "slayer" statute,29 which might,
with some modification, serve as a model for this state and could serve to
put the question entirely beyond the realm of judicial speculation over the
binding effect of stare decisis-0 Such a statute could be made to cover
not only the joint tenancy situations, such as the one found in the instant
ease, but could provide for testate and intestate situations as well.8 ' In
the joint tenancy situation, the Pennsylvania version of the statute pro-
vides that the victim's estate is entitled at once to a one-half or other pro-
portionate interest in the jointly owned property and is to gain the other
one-half or proportionate share upon the death of the slayer unless the
latter obtains a separation or severance of the property or a decree grant-
ing partition.
In the absence of such a statute, those American courts which have
been faced with this and kindred problems have had the burden of select-
ing from among the aforementioned four theories. Of the four, the con-
structive trust and the tenancy in common theories appear to be the most
satisfactory ways of achieving the end that no man should be permitted
be in the natural course of events and that it will not be generated by either tenant
murdering the other. One of the implied conditions of the contract is that neither
party will acquire the interest of the other by murder." 7 Ill. (2d) 106 at 118,
129 N. E. (2d) 690 at 705.
27 Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 110 N. E. (2d) 258 (1953).
28 See, in particular, the opinions in Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N. W. (2d)
385 (1952) ; Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 A. 517 (1933) ; and Wenker
v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P. (2d) 971 (1969).
29 Purdon Pa. Stat. Ann., Cum. Supp. 1950, Tit. 20, Ch. 10, § 3441 et seq.
30 To offset the defense contention that the instant case was controlled by the
holding in Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1951), the court said it
had "the power and duty under the doctrine of stare decisis to re-examine the
authorities and legal concepts invoked in that opinion .. . for the doctrine . . . is
a salutary but not an inflexible rule furthering the practical administration of
justice." 7 Ill. (2d) 106 at 111, 129 N. E. (2d) 699 at 702. See also the address by
Klingbiel, J., of the Illinois Supreme Court, reported in 44 Ill. B. J. 210-3 (1955).
31 For a complete discussion of the statutory solution and the construction of a
model statute, see Wade, "Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another-A
Statutory Solution," 49 Harv. L. Rev. 715 (1936). See also note in 29 CHIcAGo-KENT
LAW REvIEw 260 at 262.
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to profit by his own misdeeds. The court in the instant case, contrary to
the views it expressed less than four years ago, approved the constructive
trust theory but it applied the equally equitable tenancy in common
theory to reduce the possibility of future attack on the ground that it had
thereby worked an unconstitutional forfeiture of property rights. It is
to be hoped that the Illinois law in this respect may now be said to be
settled.
G. L. BERMAN
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-ACTIONS-WHETHER FILING OF GRIEVANCE
COMPLAINT AGAINST ATTORNEY IS PRIVILEGED OR WILL SUPPORT ACTION FOR
MALIcIous PRosucUTION-A question of interest to members of the legal
profession was raised in the recent New Jersey case of Toft v. Ketchum,1
wherein an attorney, after an unsuccessful attempt by the defendant to
have the plaintiff disbarred or otherwise penalized for alleged improper
conduct,2 sued to recover damages for an alleged malicious prosecution.
A motion by defendant to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action was granted by the trial court. While the plaintiff's appeal
was pending before the Appellate Division of the Superior Court, the
New Jersey Supreme Court certified the appeal on its own motion and
affirmed the trial court when it reached the conclusion that public policy
dictated that grievance complaints against attorneys were to be con-
sidered as privileged in nature, hence the filing thereof could not be con-
sidered as forming the basis for a subsequent action in the nature of a suit
for malicious prosecution. Upon a rehearing, the court reaffirmed its
decision on the same grounds.8 The plaintiff then petitioned the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and the New Jersey State
Bar Association presented a motion for leave to file a brief as amicus
curiae in support of the plaintiff's petition. The motion was granted but
the writ of certiorari was denied,4 so it would now appear that a lawyer
against whom a disbarment proceeding has been maliciously instigated
is afforded scant, if any, protection under the law.
1 18 N. J. 280, 113 A. (2d) 671 (1955). Jacobs, J., wrote a concurring opinion.
Wachenfeld and Burling, JJ., each wrote a dissenting opinion.
2 The prior proceedings had, apparently, been dismissed because the alleged un-
ethical conduct took place in relation to the lawyer's business as a licensed real
estate broker and was not directly related to his practice of law. Subsequent
thereto, the court held, in In re Carlsen, 17 N. J. 338, 111 A. (2d) 393 (1955), and
in In re Genser, 15 N. J. 600, 105 A. (2d) 829 (1954), that jurisdiction did exist to
support investigations as to alleged unethical conduct on the part of lawyers even
when the conduct grew out of non-legal matters. See, on that point, In re Serritella,
5 IlI. (2d) 392, 125 N. E. (2d) 531 (1955).
5 18 N. J. 611, 114 A. (2d) 863 (1955). The court remained aligned as It stood
at the time of the original opinion.
4 350 U. S. 887, 76 S. Ct. 141, 100 L. Ed. (adv.) 79 (1955).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, at the time it decided the instant
case, was faced with basically the very same dilemma 5 that has perplexed
the judicial mind throughout the long history of the tort of malicious
prosecution. The establishment of an action of this nature, beset as it is
with four rigorous elements of proof,6 took into account both horns of the
dilemma and was, to say the least, a masterful solution to the problem.
In due time, this new found remedy for malicious criminal prosecution
was extended to maliciously instituted civil proceedings 7 and, in even
more recent times, this same remedy was further broadened so as to per-
mit a suit for malicious prosecution founded upon an earlier administra-
tive proceeding of a judicial character, provided all necessary elements
were present.8 The tort of malicious prosecution has not, however,
escaped further restrictions. The law has cast a shroud of absolute im-
munity about malicious instigators and prosecutors when acting in the
furtherance of some interest of paramount public importance, 9 and much
the same sort of immunity has been extended to various public officers.' 0
The cases wherein attorneys have brought suits for malicious prosecution
based on complaints filed with grievance committees have not been numer-
ous, yet while the decisions generally have not been in favor of the attor-
neys, none of the earlier decisions had been predicated on the theory of an
absolute privilege.1 It is true that the present case is not one likely to
5 One suggestion of dilemma Is this comment on the action for malicious prose-
cution, to-wit: "Its progress was gradual, for it had to make its way between two
competing principles, -the freedom of action that every man should have in
bringing criminals to justice and the necessity for checking lying accusations of
innocent people. For some time the Judges oscillated between apprehension of
scaring off a just accuser and fear of encouraging a false one." See Winfield, A
Text-Book of the Law of Tort (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., London, 1937), p. 643.
6According to Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West Publishing Co.,
St. Paul, 1941), p. 862, those elements are: "1. A criminal proceeding instituted or
continued by the defendant against the plaintiff. 2. Termination of the proceeding
in favor of the accused. 3. Absence of probable cause for the proceeding. 4.
'Malice,' or a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to Justice."
7 When this extension was first made to cover maliciously instituted civil pro-
ceedings, two additional requirements were introduced, to-wit: arrest of person or
seizure of property, and actual damage in excess of the costs recoverable in the
original action: Muldoon v. Rickey, 103 Pa. St. 110 (1883). In later decisions,
however, arrest or seizure of property have been deemed non-essential: Kolka v.
Jones, 6 N. D. 461, 71 N. W. 558 (1897), and annotation in 143 A. L. R. 157,
together with cases there cited.
8 The first case so holding was that of National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. (2d)
145 (1932), rehear. den. 59 F. (2d) 370 (1932). See also Fulton v. Ingalls, 151
N. Y. S. 130 (1914), affirmed In 214 N. Y. 665, 108 N. E. 1094 (1915), and Melvin v.
Pence, 130 F. (2d) 423 (1942).
9 Prosser, op. cit., pp. 822-3.
10 See, for example, Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F. (2d) 135 (1938), cert. den. 305
U. S. 643, 59 S. Ct. 146, 83 L. Ed. 414 (1938).
11 For two such examples, see Lancaster v. McKay, 103 Ky. 616, 45 S. W. 887
(1898), and Werner v. Hearst Publications, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 667, 151 P. (2d) 308
(1944).
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arouse sympathy for the attorney involved, but the court made it clear
that it was not resting its decision on this circumstance when it posited
the far-reaching principle that all complaints filed with grievance com-
mittees are to be regarded as absolutely privileged.1
2
As the concurring opinion of Justice Jacobs indicates, the court could
have reached the same decision on grounds less startling than that of
absolute privilege. The fact that the County Ethics and Grievance Com-
mittee had conducted extensive hearings and acted upon the results of
its own independent investigations would afford one defense13 and also
suggests the possible presence of two others, to-wit: advice of counsel
14
and the existence of probable cause. 15 In addition, since the committee's
preliminary hearings, which might be considered to be judicial in nature,'8
did not terminate in favor of the plaintiff, another formidable defense
would also seem to be available to the defendant. 1 7  The presence of any
of these enumerated defenses would strongly suggest that the defendant
had registered her complaint with the grievance committee in the proper
spirit and without malice, an element which, very obviously, is essential
to any malicious prosecution case.' 8 It would appear, therefore, that the
ordinary person who finds it necessary to bring a complaint of improper
or unethical conduct against an attorney would usually be amply pro-
tected, hence would be unlikely to need any additional protection in the
form of an absolute privilege. Nevertheless, the court, in the instant case,
held that public policy dictated that all such complaints should be privi-
leged.
Prior to its holding in the instant case, the New Jersey Supreme
Court had said, in the case of Kamm v. Flink,19 that the "right to pursue
a lawful business is a property right that the law protects against unjus-
tifiable interference. Any act or omission which unjustifiably disturbs or
impedes the enjoyment of such a right constitutes its wrongful invasion
12 See, in particular, Cowan, "Torts," in Survey of the Law of New Jersey for
1954-55, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 1 at p. 130.
'3 Werner v. Hearst Publications, 65 Cal. App. (2d) 667, 151 P. (2d) 308 (1944)
38 C. J., Malicious Prosecution, § 25, p. 397.
14 King v. Apple River Power Co., 131 Wis. 575, 111 N. W. 668 (1907) ; 34 Am.
Jur., Malicious Prosecution, § 71, p. 747, and cases cited.
15 Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 65 U. S. (24 How.) 544, 16 L. Ed. 765 (1861) ; 34 Am. Jur.,
Malicious Prosecution, § 46, p. 729, and cases cited.
16 They were said to be of this character in the majority opinion written by
Vanderbilt, Ch. J.
17 54 C. J. S., Malicious Prosecution, § 54, p. 1019.
18 Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187, 25 L. Ed. 116 (1879) ; 54 C. J. S., Malicious
Prosecution, § 40, p. 1003.
19 113 N. J. L. 582, 175 A. 62 (1934).
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and is properly treated as tortious. "20 If this principle can be said to
apply for the protection of those members of the community who are
engaged in the real estate business,21 in the business of insurance,22 and
in the business of crime detection, 23 it is difficult, indeed, to understand
why those engaged in the legal profession should be placed beyond the
penumbra of this salutary principle. As the dissenting judge indicated,
an attorney, perhaps more than anyone else, may "suffer serious injury
when false and malicious accusations of unprofessional conduct are lodged
against him in the form of a complaint before a grievance committee."'24
Certainly, an attorney, simply because he is an attorney, is put to no less
expense in defending against such malicious accusations. True it is, as
the majority of the court pointed out, that the courts are charged with
the duty of maintaining the purity and excellence of the bar and, to that
end, it is not desirable to discourage legitimate complaints. But any
policy that would confer on a complainant an absolute privilege falsely and
maliciously to ruin an attorney's reputation and to destroy his livelihood
conspicuously disregards the sage injunction to the judiciary to "hear
the other side," produces a measure of judicial unbalance, and leaves the
aforementioned dilemma unmastered.
The majority of the New Jersey court attempts, in its decision, to
bridge the abyss it has created at the feet of the practicing attorney by
suggesting that, since disciplinary proceedings are judicial in nature, the
attorney enjoys the protection of the court under its power to cite for
contempt those who file false complaints. Contempt proceedings, however,
can be initiated only by the court, not by the attorney, and, as Professor
Cowan has observed, it is very doubtful that contempt proceedings against
a complainant would be consistent with the theory of absolute privilege.25
Even if such proceedings were permitted, the penalty of incarceration or
fine which the court might exact for the contempt would not be likely to
compensate the attorney for the time and money spent in defending him-
self, much less compensate for the injury done to his reputation. If pro-
tection through contempt proceedings is meant to be more than a fanciful
fortress for the attorney, the threat thereof might be said to serve as a
20113 N. J. L. 582 at 586, 175 A. 62 at 66.
21 Saum v. Proudflt, 122 N. J. L. 96, 4 A. (2d) 35 (1939). A real estate broker
there brought a suit for malicious prosecution based on a false complaint registered
with the real estate commission.
22 National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F. (2d) 145 (1932), involved an insurance
agent who was permitted to maintain a suit for malicious prosecution on a
proceeding to revoke his license.
23 Melvin v. Pence, 130 F. (2d) 423 (1942), concerned a private detective who
sued for malicious prosecution on false charges filed with licensing authorities.
24 See the opinion of Wachenfeld, J., 18 N. J. 280 at 292, 113 A. (2d) 671 at 678.
25 See article mentioned in note 12, ante.
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more serious deterrent than "the milder and more protective malicious
prosecution action. '2
In any event, it can be said that the possible existence of this latter
remedy has not, as the statistics will bear out, proved to be a deterrent
to the filing of charges against attorneys.27  While these same statistics
would indicate that the practicing attorney who is charged with personal
or professional misconduct can expect fair and impartial treatment at the
hands of a grievance or an inquiry committee, it should be noted that these
bodies also act as the prosecuting attorney in the event disciplinary action
is undertaken. With all due respect to the members of such committees,
whose services are generally rendered gratuitously, the stakes from the
standpoint of the accused attorney are much too high to be entrusted
solely to tribunals burdened with duties comparable to those performed by
the prosecuting attorney, the grand jury, and the public defender.
28
Perhaps the most serious criticism that can be directed against the
decision in the instant case is that it denies to attorneys the equal pro-
tection of the laws, even if it does not deprive them of their property
without due process, in violation of constitutional mandate.
29  Up until
this case was decided, members of the bar typically have enjoyed the
same types and degrees of protection accorded to the members of other
professions. 0 The decision would now relegate the members of an honor-
able profession to the status of second class citizens who may, at any time,
26 The quotation is taken from p. 8 of the brief of the New Jersey State Bar
Association, Intervenor and Amicus Curiae, filed in the United States Supreme
Court in connection with the petition for certiorari in the instant case.
27 The New Jersey Law Journal, under date of March 30, 1950, reports that: "75
to 90 of every 100 complaints are of the unsubstantial or crack-pot variety [and
the] great majority of the remainder have resulted in acquittals." Phillips and
McCoy, Conduct of Judges and Lawyers (Parker and Co., Los Angeles, 1952), have
indicated that, in the twenty-one year period from 1928 to 1948, the Illinois State
Bar Association received 566 complaints. Of these, 538 were dismissed by the
Grievance Committee. Disciplinary action was recommended in only 28 instances.
The Illinois Supreme Court ordered disbarment in 17 cases, directed suspension
in 9, and dismissed 2. During this same period, the Chicago Bar Association re-
ceived an estimated 18,000 complaints; referred approximately 8,600 of these to its
Committees on Inquiry; and these committees dismissed about 8,200 of the claims.
28 Charles H. Borden, reporting for the Committee of Inquiry of the Chicago Bar
Association, Annual Reports 194748, p. 13, notes that the "Committee on Inquiry
.. might be called Prosecuting Attorney, the Grand Jury, and the Public Defender
all rolled into one."
29 See U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
30 A recent example of this fact may be seen in the holding in the case of Em-
ployers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Freeman, 229 F. (2d) 547 (1955), wherein it
was pointed out that a third person's interference with the contractual relations
existing between an attorney and his client could amount to an actionable wrong.
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be forced into an arena, like gladiators stripped of mail and sword, to
face the assaults of an unlimited number of malicious antagonists, all of
whom would be shielded, as well as armed to the hilt, with absolute privi-
lege. The prospect is not an inviting one and the court which formulated
it is not entitled to congratulations for having done so.
A. F. PoLICK
NEGLiGENCE-AcTS OR OMISSIONs CONSTITUTING NPGLiGENcz-
WHETHER A CERTIm PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT IS LIABLE FOR LOSSES TO A
CLIENT RESULTING FROM ACCOUNTANT'S FAILURE TO VERIFY CORRECTNESS
OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE-Plaintiff, in the case of Cereal Byproducts
Company v. Hall,' sought to recover damages resulting from the alleged
negligence of defendants, a firm of certified public accountants, in audit-
ing the books of plaintiff. Defendants had been employed to make an
annual audit of plaintiff's books and to prepare its federal income tax
returns. The plaintiff's case was based upon the alleged negligence of the
defendants in accepting a list of accounts receivable not to be confirmed
from an employee of the plaintiff, without the consent or knowledge of any
of the officers of the corporation. A bookkeeper's defalcations were thus
permitted to remain undiscovered. As a result, substantial losses were
suffered, for which the company sought to recover. On appeal by the
plaintiffs from an adverse decision following a trial without a jury, the
Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois held that the defendant's
conduct was sufficiently negligent so as to make the accounting firm liable
for the loss which resulted therefrom, so it reversed and remanded with
directions to find the defendants guilty of negligence.
The problem thus posed is apparently one not heretofore reviewed by
the Illinois courts. It may be well, therefore, to treat with the decisions
in other jurisdictions. In England, the duties of auditors are defined by
statute, to a limited extent, in that their report must state (1) whether
or not they have obtained all the information and explanations they have
required, and (2) whether, in their opinion, the balance sheet to which
they have referred in the report has been properly prepared so as to
exhibit a true and correct view of the state of the company's affairs
according to the best of their information and the explanations given
them and as shown by the books of the company.2 In order to prepare
such a report, the auditor must, then, examine the books, not merely for
the purpose of satisfying himself as to what they show but also to ascer-
tain that what they show presents the true financial position of the corn-
18 Ill. App. (2d) 331, 182 N. E. (2d) 27 (1956). Appeal dismissed.
2 See Companies Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. V, c. 23, § 134.
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pany.8 In that connection, Lord Justice Lindley, in the case entitled In
re London and General Bank (No. 2),4 said: "Such I take to be the
duty of the auditor: he must be honest--.e., he must not certify what he
does not believe to be true, and he must take reasonable care and skill
before he believes that what he certifies is true. What is reasonable care
in any particular case must depend upon the circumstances of that case.
Where there is nothing to excite suspicion very little inquiry will be suffi-
cient, and in practice I believe business men select a few cases at hap-
hazard, see that they are right, and assume that others like them are
correct also. Where suspicion is aroused more care is obviously necessary;
but, still, an auditor is not bound to exercise more than reasonable care
and skill, even in a case of suspicion, and he is perfectly justified in act-
ing on the opinion of an expert where special knowledge is required.' ,5
Speaking of how the auditor is to ascertain whether the books and
records do, in fact, show that position, the court said it was his duty
to "check the cash, examine vouchers for payments, see that the bills and
securities entered in the books were held by the [client], and take care
to ascertain their value." 6 It would also be his duty to consider whether
payments made by the company before the audit were ultra vires,7 and
he may, at least in England, be considered negligent if he accepts a cer-
tificate issued by brokers of the company to the effect that securities are
in their possession, however trustworthy they may be, unless the cer-
tificate has been given by a bank or other person who, in the ordinary
course of business, would be entrusted with securities.8 Although it
8 Leeds Estate, Building & Investment Co. v. Shepherd, 36 Ch. D. 787 (1887);
Cuff v. London and County Land & Building Co., [1912] 1 Ch. 440.
4 [1895] 2 Ch. 678.
5 [1895] 2 Ch. 673 at 683. See also Fox & Son v. Moorish, Grant & Co., 35 T. L.
R. 126 (1918), and Mead v. Ball, 106 L. T. 197 (1912).
6 [1895] 2 Ch. 673 at 684. In the case mentioned, the auditors were cognizant of
the worthless character of the accounts receivable, one of the chief assets of the
bank, but their report to the stockholders and to the directors was modified, at the
insistence of the managing director, so as not to discourage the payment of a divi-
dend. The court held this to be a failure to maintain the standard of honesty
owed by the auditors to the shareholders. See also Western Counties Steam
Bakeries & Milling Co., [1897] 1 Ch. 617; McBride's, Ltd. v. Rooke & Thomas,
[1942] 3 D. L. R. 81 (Sask.), but compare with Dantzler Lumber Co. v. Columbia
Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934); National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand,
256 App. Div. 226, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 554 (1939), and Beardsley v. Ernst, 47 Ohio
App. 241, 191 N. E. 808 (1934).
7 That idea is expressed in the case of In re Republic of Bolivia Exploration
Syndicate, Ltd., [1914] 1 Ch. 139, but there the auditors were held entitled to rely
on the special circumstances of the case. See also Thomas v. Devonport Corpora-
tion, [1900] 1 Q. B. 16, but note that the client there concerned was a municipal
corporation. Compare the holding therein with the case of Board of Commissioners
of Allen County v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164, 102 P. (2d) 1006 (1940).
8 In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co., [1925] Ch. 407. But see Canadian
Woodmen of the World v. Hooper, [1933] 1 D. L. R. 168, where the importance of
a physical verification of the securities on hand was emphasized.
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would not be the duty of the auditor to take stock when auditing the
accounts of a company, he may well be required to call for particular items
in the stock sheets.9 He may, of course, limit the scope of his audit by
his contract of employment so long as, by so doing, he does not seek to
avoid his statutory duties.10
In the United States, legislative control over the practice of account-
ing is to be found only in connection with licensing statutes that pertain
to public accountants or to certified public accountants. Of these, the
Illinois statute is typical."1 The Securities and Exchange Commission
has also, to some extent, defined the accountant's duties and has required
certain audit procedures. 12  In addition, pursuant to an attempt to pro-
vide a guide for its members, the American Institute of Accountants has
made pronouncements from time to time with respect to auditing stand-
ards. Of particular significance, in that connection, is the extension of
auditing procedures, made in 1939, to include the confirmation of receiv-
ables whenever this asset represents a significant proportion of the cur-
rent assets or of the total assets of a business.' It might be said, there-
fore, that the general standard of care as adopted by the courts of Eng-
land has become the American rule as well.
14
9 Squire, Cash Chemist v. Ball, Baker & Co., 106 L. T. 197 (1911). The court
stressed the proposition that an auditor should make a reasonable and proper
investigation. See also In re Kingston Cotton Mill Company (No. 2), [1896] 2
Ch. D. 279 at 288, where the court did say: "He is justified in believing tried
servants of the company in whom confidence is placed by the company. He is
entitled to assume that they are honest, and to rely upon their representations,
provided he takes reasonable care."
10 International Laboratories, Ltd. v. Dewar, 41 Manitoba L. R. 329 (1933) ; Fox
& Son v. Moorish, Grant & Co., 35 T. L. R. 126 (1918). Compare with O'Neill v.
Atlas Automobile Finance Corp., 139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A. (2d) 782 (1940).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110%, § 1 et seq. The statute provides generally
for the qualifications, examination, registration, etc., of public accountants. Of
particular interest is Section 44 thereof, which provides that a license may be
revoked for any one, or any combination, of the causes there mentioned, including
knowingly certifying to any false or fraudulent report, certificate, schedule, and
the like, or for gross carelessness or incompetence.
12 For a discussion of the influence of the Securities and Exchange Commission
in this regard, see comment entitled "Accounting Principles and Auditing Responsi-
bilities Established Under The Securities Acts," 33 Ill. L. Rev. 820-44 (1939). See
also 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 77a-78hh. For an example of the Commission's position on
auditing procedures, see Sec. & Exch. Com., Accounting Release, No. 91, December
5, 1940.
13 See American Institute of Accountants, Statements on Auditing Procedures,
No. 1, October 1939.
14 O'Connor v. Ludlum, 92 F. (2d) 50 (1937) ; Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v.
Columbia Casualty Co., 115 Fla. 541, 156 So. 116 (1934); Board of County Com'rs
of Allen County v. Baker, 152 Kan. 164, 102 P. (2d) 1006 (1940) ; City of East
Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn. 296, 141 N. W. 181 (1913) ; State Street Trust
Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. (2d) 416 (1938) ; Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931); National Surety Corp. v. Lybrand,
256 App. Div. 226, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 554 (1939) ; Smith v. London Assur. Corp., 109
App. Div. 882, 96 N. Y. S. 820 (1905) ; O'Neill v. Atlas Automobile Finance Corp.,
139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A. (2d) 782 (1940).
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By way of illustrating this point, attention could be called to some of
the cases in the field. In the case of Craig v. Anyon,15 for example, the
auditors relied on the records and reports supplied by a trusted margin
clerk, employed by their client, a brokerage firm. By reason of the audi-
tor's failure to circularize and verify certain of the customers' accounts,
the employee's manipulations in these accounts, designed to conceal his
embezzlement of large sums of money, were permitted to remain undis-
covered. The court, in a three-to-one decision, regarded the auditor's
conduct as being clearly negligent, but denied relief because of the con-
tributory negligence on the plaintiff's part. In Maryland Casualty Com-
pany v. Cook,18 an auditor of the city's books and records also failed to
circularize the delinquent accounts outstanding and it was held that this,
together with other omissions, constituted negligence. The importance of
verifying the trial balance with the control and proving its clerical accu-
racy was stressed in the case of O'Neill v. Atlas Automobile Finance Cor-
poration17 and the proper classification of accounts and notes due from
subsidiaries, together with the auditor's responsibility for a proper dis-
play of collateral securing the receivables, was emphasized in the case of
O'Connor v. Ludlam.1 8
Among the leading cases on the subject is that of Ultramares Corpo-
ration v. Touche,19 in which case the accountants were held to be negligent
for their failure to verify a list of entries to the ledger, purporting to
represent accounts receivable, when a mere glance at the supporting docu-
ments would have disclosed their falsity. In another leading case, that of
State Street Trust Company v. Ernst,20 the New York Court of Appeals,
in a four-to-one decision, held the auditing firm guilty of a degree of gross
negligence which was sufficient to raise an inference of fraud. The court
there permitted recovery by a creditor of the client on a showing that the
credit had been extended in reliance upon statements prepared by the
15212 App. Div. 55, 208 N. Y. S. 259 (1925). Clark, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Compare the holding therein with the McKesson & Robbins case, See. &
Exch. Com., Accounting Release No. 19, December 5, 1940, p. 8. See also Blue Band
Navigation Company v. Price-Waterhouse & Co., (1934) 3 D. L. R. 404.
16 35 F. Supp. 160 (1940). See also City of East Grand Forks v. Steele, 121 Minn.
296, 141 N. W. 181 (1913), but compare with Fidelity & Deposit Company of Mary-
land v. A. L. Atherton, 47 N. M. 443, 144 P. (2d) 157 (1944).
17139 Pa. Super. 346, 11 A. (2d) 782 (1940).
1892 F. (2d) 50 (1937). The point is also discussed In State Street Trust Co.
v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. (2d) 416 (1938).
19 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931). See also Owens v. Waterhouse, 225 App.
Div. 582, 233 N. Y. S. 535 (1929).
20 278 N. Y. 104, 15 N. E. (2d) 416 (1938). Compare the holding therein with the
results attained in O'Connor v. Ludlum, 92 F. (2d) 50 (1937) ; Flagg v. Senf, 16
Cal. App. (2d) 545, 60 P. (2d) 1004 (1936); Glanzer v. Shepherd, 233 N. Y. 236,
135 N. E. 275 (1922) ; Smith v. Hedges, 223 N. Y. 176, 119 N. E. 396 (1918) ; and
Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919).
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defendants, in which statements the auditors had failed to question the way
in which certain bad debt reserves had been computed. A dissenting
judge, who regarded the auditors' report as being based upon an honest
opinion, although a somewhat over-optimistic one, refused to concur with
the majority opinion that fraud was present but did agree with the propo-
sition that the failure to give the information an effect which expert wit-
nesses testified should, in their opinion, be given to it was enough to con-
stitute negligence.
The degree of consistency to be found in both the English and the
American cases treating with the problem posed by the instant case is
significant when viewed in the light of the increasingly heightened posi-
tion which the public accountant occupies in the structure of modern
commercial society. If the rule of reason, as heretofore applied, were not
so closely adhered to as a measure of the accountant's duty of care, audit-
ing procedures might well be changed to conform to a single method or
approach. If that approach must, of necessity, include detailed pro-
cedures not always warranted by the circumstance, the expense of such an
audit could be burdensome, if not actually ruinous, to many business
men. Nevertheless, if the accountant does not effectively qualify his
responsibility at the outset, he must observe the standards of care laid
down by law for those who engage in that type of activity or else must
suffer the consequences. Taken in this light, the decision in the instant
case is one well-grounded in sound law.
S. D. WESS
PARENT AND CHILD-ACTIONS BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD--WHETHER
MINOR MAY MAINTAIN ACTION AGAINST PARENT FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY
WILFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT OF PARENT-By reason of having
granted leave to appeal in the case of Nudd v. Matsoukas,' the Illinois
Supreme Court recently came to possess a firm grip on the problem as to
whether or not a child should be permitted to maintain an action in tort
against the parent to recover damages flowing from the culpable fault of
the parent. The complaint therein had alleged that the father had wil-
fully, recklessly and wantonly2 driven his vehicle through a stop light at
1 7 Ill. (2d) 608, 131 N. E. (2d) 525 (1956), reversing 6 Ill. App. (2d) 504, 128
N. E. (2d) 609 (1965). See also the case of Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. (2d) 421,
289 P. (2d) 218 (1955), wherein the California Supreme Court, while recognizing
that the basic policy behind the rule of parental immunity was the preservation of
the parent's right to discipline his minor child, nevertheless held that an un-
emancipated minor could sue his parent for a wilful or malicious tort inflicted by
the parent on the child.
2 This charge was made necessary because Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95%,
1 58a, denies recovery by a guest passenger against the host-driver in simple negli-
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an excessive rate of speed on a foggy night thereby causing the same to
collide with an automobile driven by the other defendant and, as a con-
sequence, producing the death of his wife, mother of the principal plain-
tiff, and that of one minor child while also seriously injuring the plain-
tiff, another minor child, all of whom were passengers in the automobile.
Under one count of the complaint, the husband-father was charged with
causing a wrongful death to the detriment of the surviving minor child.8
By a separate count, the surviving child, through his next friend, sought
to hold his father and the other driver liable for the personal injury so
sustained. A trial court order dismissing these counts as to the parent
was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District on the theory
that the father-defendant was entitled to a parental immunity from lia-
bility. The Supreme Court, however, reversed this holding when it reached
the conclusion that, whatever the rule might be as to parental responsi-
bility for negligent harm inflicted on a child, the immunity did not extend
to save the wilful, wanton or reckless parent from liability.
The concept of immunity of the parent from suits in tort by uneman-
cipated minor children has been the basis of a great amount of litigation
in American courts for the last sixty years, and the most cursory examina-
tion of the 'subject reveals that the majority of jurisdictions in the past
have denied liability of the parent for a variety of reasons, 4 few of which
can withstand a severe critical analysis. From the modern historical point
of view, probably the initial adjudication of the problem arose in the
gence cases. As to whether a minor child may be said to be a "guest" when riding
with the parent of another, a point not resolved by the opinion in the instant case,
see Fuller v. Thrun, 109 Ind. App. 407, 31 N. E. (2d) 670 (1941). There is an
indirect treatment of the subject in Johnson v. Chicago & North Western Railway
Co., 9 Ill. App. (2d) 340, 132 N. E. (2d) 678 (1956), where an administrator of a
deceased minor grandchild's estate was permitted a recovery against the estate of
the deceased grandparent who had recklessly driven an automobile onto a railroad
track despite the warning given by a flashing signal.
8 The count for wrongful death was stricken on the basis that the wrongdoing
parent, who was one of the heirs at law of the persons killed in the collision, ought
not be permitted to share In the recovery and, as he was barred, all other bene-
ficiaries were necessarily barred as well. Reliance, for this purpose was placed on
the holding in Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 Il. 38, 141 N. E. 392,
30 A. L. R. 491 (1923). The Supreme Court, taking note of the fact that the
Wrongful Death Act had been specifically amended in 1955 to obviate the hardships
posed by the earlier holdings (Laws 1955, pp. 293 and 2006; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2), which amendment became effective after the incidents Involved
in the case at hand, expressly overruled the decision in the Hazel case, saying it
rested on a distinction that was "fictitious rather than real." It may now be said
to be the law, both as reflected in legislation and in judicial decision, that the
negligence of a defendant-beneficiary will not serve to defeat a recovery for wrongful
death by other non-negligent beneficiaries.
4McCurdy, "Torts Between Persons In Domestic Relation," 43 Harv. L. Rev.
1030-82 (1930), at p. 1072.
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Mississippi case of Hewellette v. George5 wherein the court denied to a
minor daughter both punitive and compensatory damages in a suit against
her mother for false imprisonment. At the time it refused recovery on
the ground of public policy, the Mississippi Supreme Court there stated
that the "peace of society" forbade that a minor child should have the
"right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. '"8 Fourteen years
later, the Supreme Court of Washington, in a ridiculous and unrealistic
application of the doctrine of domestic tranquility, went so far as to deny
relief to a minor daughter who had been raped by her father.7 It is true
that the court there stated that the common law served to prohibit suits
of this type but it would appear that there never was a clear common law
doctrine prohibiting minors from suing their parents in tort.8
The doctrine expounded in the Hewellette case, however, was pretty
generally followed in the United States up until the time of the case of
Dunlap v. Dunlap.9 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire there held
that the aforementioned public policy would have no application where
the unemancipated minor, seeking damages for injuries sustained while
employed by the father, could show that the father was insured and
5 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). The views there expressed still seem to prevail
In Mississippi for, in Durham v. Durham, - Miss. -, 85 So. (2d) 807 (1956), the
court held that an unemancipated minor could not maintain a wrongful death action
against her father whose negligence, in causing an automobile accident, was the
prime factor in producing the death of the minor's mother. See also Smith v.
Smith, 81 Ind. App. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924), and McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111
Tenn. 338, 77 S. W. 664 (1903). But see Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 76 Am. Dec.
156 (1859).
6 68 Miss. 703 at 711, 9 So. 885 at 887.
7 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905). The court stated that the
criminal law served to protect the child from this type of injury.
s Eversley, The Law of The Domestic Relation (Stevens & Haynes, London,
1906), 3d Ed., p. 578, says: "The right of a child to bring an action against his
parents in respect to the latter's dealings with his property is unquestioned." The
author then goes on to say that while it is not clear whether a minor child can sue
his parent for tort, there is no common law rule to prevent such action from being
brought. See also Reeve, The Law of Husband and Wife, Parent and Child,
Guardian and Ward, Master and Servant (Win. Gould, Jr. & Co., Albany, N. Y.,
1888), 4th Ed., p. 357, wherein it Is stated that at common law an action could be
brought against a parent by a child, even for a tort, with the author saying:
"The maxim is that he has the power to chastise him moderately. The exercise of
this power must be in a great measure discretionary. He may so chastise his child
as to be liable in an action against him for a battery. The child has rights which
the law will protect against the brutality of a barbarous parent."
984 N. H. 352, 150 A. 905, 71 A. L. R. 1055 (1930). For cases prior thereto
holding that insurance should not be a factor see Mesite v. Kirchstein, 109 Conn.
77, 145 A. 753 (1929); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N. W. 88 (1926);
Damiano v. Damiano, 6 N. J. Misc. 849, 143 A. 3 (1928) ; Small v. Morrison, 185
N. C. 577, 188 S. E. 12 (1923). Even after 1960, some courts have applied the
parental immunity doctrine where the parent was insured: Rambo v. Rambo, 195
Ark. 832, 114 S. W. (2d) 468 (1938) ; Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E. (2d)
438 (1938) ; and Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. (2d) 677 (1948).
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thereby place the burden of paying damages on the insurer. It might
also be mentioned that there has been conflict on the point as to whether
the parental immunity should be extended to persons who stand in the
relation of in loco parentis.10 The specific nature of the particular rela-
tionship, in this instance, probably should be a determining factor for a
person who has permanent control over a minor child would need to
exercise a greater amount of judgment and discretion than one who has no
more than a temporary custody.
It is quite likely that the domestic tranquility argument derived some
support from an analogy to the common law relationship of husband and
wife wherein, prior to legislation in the field, the common law rule seemed
to be that neither spouse could sue the other in tort.1 That analogy has
tended to fail in recent years for most states have enacted legislation, gen-
erally classified as Married Women's Acts, which partially, if not com-
pletely, destroy the legal immunities which may have existed between
husband and wife because of the marital relationship.' 2  Moreover, since
the common law allowed an infant a right of action against a parent in
debt, or to recover real estate, or to require the parent, as trustee, to
account for trust funds held by the parent for the infant, it does seem
anomalous to deny to the infant a right of action for harm done to the
person. As a consequence, at least two jurisdictions have permitted
unemancipated minors to sue where, at the time of the injury, the rela-
tionship was more nearly that of carrier and passenger,' 3 and still others
sanction a recovery where the injuries were sustained because of the negli-
gence of the parent while he was acting in the scope of his employment.
14
Nevertheless, it must be said that a large body of authority still sus-
tains the application of the parental immunity doctrine where the act of
10 Immunity of the type mentioned has been extended in Foley v. Foley, 61 Ill
App. 577 (1895); Fortinberry v. Holmes, 89 Miss. 373, 42 So. 799 (1906); and
Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124 S. W. (2d) 675 (1939). Contra: Brown v.
Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S. W. (2d) 245 (1939); Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App.
241, 117 S. E. 828 (1935) ; Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961
(1901); Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913) ; Clasen v. Pruhs,
69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (1903) ; Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N. W. 173
(1925).
1127 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, § 589, p. 191; 41 C. J. S., Husband and Wife,
§ 396, p. 877.
12 See note in 30 CHICAGo-KEnT LAW REvrnw 343-9. Insofar as torts to the person
are concerned, however, the majority of the courts still apply the common law rule:
Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P. (2d) 933 (1952). See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1.
18 Worrell v. Worreil, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. (2d) 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
14 Radlecki v. Travis, 39 N. J. Super. 263, 120 A. (2d) 774 (1956) ; Foy v. Foy
Electric Co., 231 N. C. 161, 56 S. E. (2d) 418 (1949) ; Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St.
566, 103 N. E. (2d) 743 (1952) ; Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 642, 251 P. (2d) 149
(1952).
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the parent amounts to nothing more than simple negligence. 15  In this
area, perhaps, lurks the basis for the most conflict since the nature of the
relationship between parent and child rests on a much more subtle ground
than is true of the ordinary legal relationships between strangers. In
order to adequately conduct a child from infancy to majority, the parent,
of necessity, must exercise a great amount of control and discretion in
supervising the behavior of the child. To allow an injured child to con-
duct a tort action against the parent where the injury occurred as a
result of an exercise of poor parental judgment in this connection would
certainly be opening the door to a tremendous amount of domestically dis-
ruptive litigation. Even so, with the current widespread use of the auto-
mobile, the presence of liability insurance has, to some extent, eliminated
the domestic harmony predicate for the parental authority doctrine. It
would seem appropriate, therefore, if an insurance company is involved,
to permit recovery by an injured child, even one harmed as the result
of a mere negligent parental act, unless it could be clearly shown that
fraud and collusion were present. If a stranger to a parent who has pro-
tected himself with insurance is to be permitted to reap the benefit of such
insurance, what valid reason is there why an unemancipated family mem-
ber should go unaided?
In sharp contrast to the views expressed in the early cases, however,
is the modern trend which permits an unemancipated minor to conduct a
tort action against the parent, or the person standing in loco parentis,
where the injury has resulted from wilful or wanton misconduct.16 This
would appear to be a more rational approach, for it is extremely difficult
to see how any domestic tranquillity worth preserving can remain after a
15Augustin v. Ortiz, 187 F. (2d) 496 (1951); Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F. (2d)
677 (1948); Scruggs v. Meredith, 135 F. Supp. 376 (1955) ; Rambo v. Rambo, 195
Ark. 832, 114 S. W. (2d) 468 (1938) ; Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937) ;
Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E. (2d) 438 (1938) ; Strong v. Strong, 70
Nev. 296, 269 P. (2d) 265 (1954) ; Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N. J. L. 532, 181 A.
153 (1935) ; Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. (2d) 236 (1942) ; Rutkowski
v. Wasko, 286 App. Div. 327, 143 N. Y. S. (2d) 1 (1955); Epstein v. Epstein, 283
App. Div. 855, 129 N. Y. S. (2d) 54 (1954) ; Reynolds v. Marmorosch, 208 Misc. 626,
144 N. Y. S. (2d) 900 (1955); Schomber v. Tait, 207 Misc. 328, 140 N. Y. S. (2d)
746 (1955); Murphy v. Murphy, 206 Misc. 228, 133 N. Y. S. (2d) 796 (1954);
Lewis v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 243 N. C. 55, 89 S. E. (2d) 788 (1955):
Redding v. Redding, 235 N. C. 638, 70 S. E. (2d) 676 (1952) ; Small v. Morrison,
185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923) ; Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 A. 198
(1926); Ownby v. Kleyhammer, 194 Tenn. 109, 250 S. W. (2d) 37 (1952) ; Securo
v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S. E. 750 (1931) ; Ball v. Ball, 59 Wyo. 204, 269 P. (2d)
302 (1954).
16Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S. E. (2d) 152 (1952); Cannon v.
Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. (2d) 236 (1942) ; Siembab v. Siembab, 202 Misc.
1053, 112 N. Y. S. (2d) 82 (1952) ; Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N. Y. S.
(2d) 595 (1949); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S. W. (2d) 636 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954) ;
Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. (2d) 642, 251 P. (2d) 149 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932).
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father has raped his daughter,17 has cruelly and inhumanly beaten his
children,' 8 has deprived them of adequate food and clothing, 19 or has
forced them to ride in an automobile driven by an intoxicated parent.
20
Perhaps the most ridiculous attempt to defend with the doctrine of
parental immunity was the one made in the Maryland case of Mahnke v.
Moore.21 According to the facts of that case, the father had murdered
the mother in the presence of the child, kept the child with the corpse
for a week, and then committed suicide in front of her. Suing her dead
father's estate by her next friend, the child asked damages for shock,
mental anguish, and permanent physical injuries. Denying the claim of
parental immunity which had been presented as a defense, the court held
that the acts of the father showed so complete an abandonment of the
parental relation and of his parental authority and privileges as to war-
rant a decision that his immunity from suit had been forfeited.
After twenty-three years of silence in the Illinois law on the subject,
22
the instant case now exhibits a purpose on the part of the Illinois Supreme
Court to follow the modern and more enlightened viewpoint. What action
the court may take in a simple negligence case between parent and child
cannot be prophesied but the signs are now clear that the doctrine of
parental immunity is to be regarded as a privilege which will not be
remorselessly applied where the injury to the child is intentional in char-
acter or arises from wanton misconduct.
B. F. BERENS
17 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905).
Is MeKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 338, 77 S. W. 664 (1903).
19 Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N. W. 640 (1903).
20 Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. (2d) 445 (1950).
21 197 Md. 61, 77 A. (2d) 923 (1951).
22 Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 Ill. App. 164 (1933). Reference to the case
of Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N. E' (2d) 547 (1951), is omitted since the
child there concerned was a minor step-daughter who sought to recover from the
deceased step-parent's estate for the wrongful death of the minor's mother.
